



Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository

Theses and Dissertations

1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items

2016-06

The influence of Tamil diaspora on stability in Sri Lanka

Perera, U. L. J. Sylvester

Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School

<http://hdl.handle.net/10945/49365>

Copyright is reserved by the copyright owner.

Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun



Calhoun is the Naval Postgraduate School's public access digital repository for research materials and institutional publications created by the NPS community. Calhoun is named for Professor of Mathematics Guy K. Calhoun, NPS's first appointed -- and published -- scholarly author.

Dudley Knox Library / Naval Postgraduate School
411 Dyer Road / 1 University Circle
Monterey, California USA 93943

<http://www.nps.edu/library>



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

THE INFLUENCE OF TAMIL DIASPORA ON STABILITY IN SRI LANKA

by

U. L. J. Sylvester Perera

June 2016

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Douglas Borer
Ian Rice

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE June 2016	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's thesis		
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE THE INFLUENCE OF TAMIL DIASPORA ON STABILITY IN SRI LANKA			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) U. L. J. Sylvester Perera				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) Although the Sinhalese and Tamil ethnic problem is deep-rooted and of long-standing origins, in the early 1980s, it turned into an armed conflict under the leadership of Velupillai Prabahakaran, who had formed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE). The military defeat of the LTTE in 2009 did not end the Sri Lankan ethnic problem. Pro-LTTE Tamils, who have migrated and settled in many parts of the world, have created many diasporic Tamil organizations to continue their fight for a separate state. The LTTE uses the actions of the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam, the Global Tamil Forum, and the British Tamil Forum indirectly to achieve its political goal—a Tamil homeland. The Tamil Eelam People's Assembly as well as ex-combatant and intelligence groups continue to adhere to radical ideas of a re-emerging LTTE insurgency. Also, the Tamil diaspora is manipulating the Tamil National Alliance and Sri Lankan Tamils to achieve its goals. Presently, the UNHCR resolution on alleged war crimes by the Sri Lankan military is a major issue among the members of the diaspora, who wish to discredit Sri Lanka's government and military. Since Sri Lanka's independence in 1948, all successive governments have failed to find a solution for the demands of the Tamils. The government should encourage all ethnic groups to think of Sri Lanka as one nation for the promotion of peaceful coexistence.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Sri Lanka, LTTE, Tamil diaspora, re-emergence of terrorism			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 117	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

THE INFLUENCE OF TAMIL DIASPORA ON STABILITY IN SRI LANKA

U. L. J. Sylvester Perera
Lieutenant Colonel, Sri Lanka Army
BA, General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University, Sri Lanka, 1994
M Def S, University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka, 2006

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 2016**

Approved by: Douglas Borer
Thesis Advisor

Colonel Ian Rice
Second Reader

John Arquilla
Chair, Department of Defense Analysis

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ABSTRACT

Although the Sinhalese and Tamil ethnic problem is deep-rooted and of long-standing origins, in the early 1980s, it turned into an armed conflict under the leadership of Velupillai Prabahakaran, who had formed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE). The military defeat of the LTTE in 2009 did not end the Sri Lankan ethnic problem. Pro-LTTE Tamils, who have migrated and settled in many parts of the world, have created many diasporic Tamil organizations to continue their fight for a separate state. The LTTE uses the actions of the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam, the Global Tamil Forum, and the British Tamil Forum indirectly to achieve its political goal—a Tamil homeland. The Tamil Eelam People's Assembly as well as ex-combatant and intelligence groups continue to adhere to radical ideas of a re-emerging LTTE insurgency. Also, the Tamil diaspora is manipulating the Tamil National Alliance and Sri Lankan Tamils to achieve its goals. Presently, the UNHCR resolution on alleged war crimes by the Sri Lankan military is a major issue among the members of the diaspora, who wish to discredit Sri Lanka's government and military. Since Sri Lanka's independence in 1948, all successive governments have failed to find a solution for the demands of the Tamils. The government should encourage all ethnic groups to think of Sri Lanka as one nation for the promotion of peaceful coexistence.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	BACKGROUND	2
B.	MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION.....	5
C.	SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION.....	5
D.	LITERATURE REVIEW	6
1.	Origin of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam	7
2.	What Is a Diaspora?	9
3.	The Tamil Diaspora—Who Are They?.....	10
4.	Eelam Wars and the Tamil Diaspora.....	12
5.	South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commissions and Creation of South Sudan.....	14
6.	Louis Kriesberg’s Model of Conflict Cycle	16
7.	SWOT Analysis	18
8.	The Demands of the Tamil National Alliance and the Government’s Proposals	19
E.	CONCLUSION	20
F.	METHODOLOGY	21
II.	THE TAMIL DIASPORA’S ORGANIZATIONS AND GLOBAL ACTIVITIES, THE STANCE OF SRI LANKA, AND THE TAMIL NATIONAL ALLIANCE	23
A.	THE TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL EELAM.....	23
B.	THE GLOBAL TAMIL FORUM	28
C.	BRITISH TAMILS FORUM	31
D.	THE TAMIL EELAM PEOPLE’S ASSEMBLY	32
E.	LTTE HEADQUARTERS GROUP IN FRANCE	36
F.	THE TAMIL DIASPORA’S POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, UNITED STATES, AND CANADA	37
1.	United Kingdom	37
2.	United States.....	40
3.	Canada	43
G.	THE POSSIBLE RE-EMERGENCE OF TERRORISM	46
1.	Attempt 1: March 2012	47
2.	Attempt 2: December 2012.....	47
3.	Attempt 3: March 2014	48
H.	THE TAMIL NATIONAL ALLIANCE.....	49

I.	THE SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT’S STANCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND TAMIL ETHNIC PROBLEMS	52
J.	CONCLUSION	55
III.	ANALYSIS OF THE TAMIL DIASPORA’S POLITICAL SOCIAL ACTIVITIES, THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE TAMIL NATIONAL ALLIANCE	57
A.	ANALYSIS: INTERESTS OF THE TAMIL DIASPORA AND THE SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT.....	58
1.	Complementary Interests.....	58
2.	Conflicting Interests.....	60
B.	INTERESTS OF TAMIL NATIONAL ALLIANCE AND SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT.....	65
1.	Complementary Interests.....	65
2.	Conflicting Interests.....	66
C.	INTERESTS OF GOVERNMENT	68
1.	Complementary Interests.....	68
D.	EXISTING STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES, AND THREATS FOR THE SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT	70
1.	Strengths	71
2.	Weaknesses	71
3.	Opportunities.....	73
4.	Threats	74
E.	POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE IMPACTS ON SUSTAINABLE PEACE FROM POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES OF PRO-LTTE MEMBERS OF THE TAMIL DIASPORA	75
1.	Positive Impacts	75
2.	Negative Impacts.....	75
F.	CONCLUSION	76
IV.	CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION	79
A.	CONCLUSION	79
B.	RECOMMENDATIONS.....	81
1.	Political and Diplomatic	81
2.	Information and Technology	83
3.	Military	84
4.	Economy.....	85
C.	RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH.....	86
	LIST OF REFERENCES.....	89
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	97

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Map of Greater Eelam.....	4
Figure 2.	Conflict Cycle	17
Figure 3.	SWOT Analysis	19
Figure 4.	The Organization of the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam	24
Figure 5.	Global Tamil Forum Organization.....	29
Figure 6.	The Organization of Tamil Elam People's Assembly	33
Figure 7.	Organization of the LTTE Headquarters Group	37
Figure 8.	Conceptual Model for Analysis	57

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Distribution of Tamil Diaspora.....	7
----------	-------------------------------------	---

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BTC	British Tamils Conservative Party
BTF	British Tamil Forum
BTLD	British Tamils for Liberal Democratic
CHOGM	Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CTC	Canadian Tamil Congress
DIME	Diplomacy, Information and Technology, Military and Economic
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EPDP	Eelam People's Democratic Party
EU	European Union
GoSL	Government of Sri Lanka
GTF	Global Tamil Forum
ICRC	International Committee of Red Cross
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
LKR	Sri Lankan Rupees
LLRC	Lesson Learnt and Reconciliation Commission
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MP	Minister of Parliament
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCCT	National Council of Canadian Tamils
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NPoA	National Plan of Action
PM	Prime Minister
RAW	Indian Research and Analysis Wing
SLFP	Sri Lanka Freedom Party
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats
TCC	Tamil Coordinating Committee
TCP	Tamil for Conservative Party
TEPA	Tamil Eelam People's Assembly

TGTE	Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam
TLP	Tamils for Labor Party
TNC	Tamil National Council
TNLF	Tamil Nadu Liberation Front
TNA	Tamil National Alliance
TRC	South African Truth Reconciliation Commissions
TTN	Tamil Television Network
TULF	Tamil United Liberation Front
TYO	Tamil Youth Organization
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNP	United National Party
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USTPAC	United States Political Action Committee
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Although the ethnic problem between the Sinhalese and the Tamils has deep-rooted and long-standing origins, after Sri Lanka's independence in 1948, Tamil and Sinhala politicians engaged in a bitter dispute over the Tamils' demand for a separate state in the north and east of the island. In the early 1980s, the dispute turned into an armed conflict under the leadership of Velupillai Prabahakaran, who formed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE). The military defeat of the LTTE in 2009 did not end the Sri Lankan ethnic problem. Pro-LTTE Tamils, who have migrated and settled in other parts of the world due to the ethnic problem, have created many diasporic Tamil organizations to fight for their demands. The Tamil diaspora's social and political activities have directly impacted the search for solutions to the ethnic problem. Continued attempts of the Tamil diaspora to resurrect an insurgency strongly indicate that a Tamil separatist ideology still exists. The indirect approaches of the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam, the Global Tamil Forum, and the British Tamil Forum are aimed toward achieving the former LTTE's political goal—a Tamil homeland. The Tamil Eelam People's Assembly as well as the LTTE Headquarters Group continue to adhere to radical ideas of a re-emerging LTTE insurgency. These diasporic groups access the local Tamil population, especially ex-combatants, with the motive of a Tamil homeland.

Internally, another major challenge for the government is to work with the Tamil National Alliance to find a solution for the Tamil issue without further disturbing the coexistence between the Sinhalese and Tamil communities. The Tamil diaspora is manipulating the Tamil National Alliance to achieve its internal and external goals. The representation of the Tamil National Alliance in mainstream Sri Lankan politics has become a boon for the diaspora to speak to the world about the alleged wrongdoings of the government. The Tamil diaspora supports the Tamil National Alliance's aspiration—a separate state—as a cover for its hidden agenda. Conversely, the Tamil diaspora and Tamil National Alliance have not given priority to addressing the immediate concerns of the Tamil people in the North and East.

Presently, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) resolution on alleged war crimes by the Sri Lankan military is a major concern among the members of the diaspora. The Tamil diaspora has capitalized on this issue, especially in the United States, Canada, and United Kingdom, to discredit Sri Lanka's government and military. Former President Rajapaksa's administration failed to effectively handle the problem from its inception. The Tamil diaspora gained an advantage through alleging war crimes to market its "referendum" of a separate state ideology to the world. The present government has done little to address the issue in the countries where the Tamil diaspora plays a prominent role. The Sri Lankan government should face the allegation of war crimes rather than avoiding them.

Since Sri Lanka's independence in 1948, all successive governments have failed to find a genuine solution for the demands of the Tamil community. The devolution of power for balanced economic growth in the North and South is very critical. As such, the government needs to formulate a comprehensive national security strategy that encompasses economic and external affairs, security, as well as internal law and order. The ethnic problem must be identified as a priority for maintaining peace and harmony in Sri Lanka. Furthermore, the government has to prioritize establishing an independent commission and devolving power for a lasting solution to the ethnic problem. The government should encourage all ethnic groups to think of Sri Lanka as one nation, deviating from party politics for the nation to function in a healthy atmosphere of coexistence. In order to achieve a more permanent peace, the idea of one Sri Lankan national identity must be inculcated into the hearts and minds of children in all communities in the country.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis would not have been a reality without the generous help and valuable contributions from a number of great individuals. First, I would like to express profound thanks to my thesis advisor, Professor Douglas Borer, and my second reader, Colonel Ian Rice, whose constructive direction and suggestions helped invaluablely in shaping the form and content of this thesis.

It is also my duty to express my sincere gratitude to all the staff of the Graduate Writing Center, especially my writing coach Dr. Cheryldee Huddleston, and Dudley Knox Library for their guidance, advice, encouragement, and workshops, given to me while providing all possible assistance. I feel this has been invaluable to the development of this thesis.

I feel that I would be failing my duty if I did not extend my gratitude to all officers, including retired service officers, especially Brigadier H. N. Halangoda RWP RSP, Lieutenant Colonel Susantha Senevirathn, and General Staff Officer 1 of the Sri Lanka Army Directorate of Military Intelligence Branch, who also provided valuable information toward the success of this research as a whole.

Last but not least, much credit should go to my loving wife, Iresha, who helped me immensely by encouraging me to proceed with my studies and accomplish this project successfully. Also, I thank my loving son, Joel, and daughter, Andrea, for tolerating my frequent absences due to my commitment to this effort.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1976, the Tamil militancy, called the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), initiated a struggle for a separate homeland for their Sri Lankan ethnic subgroup. On May 18, 2009, after three decades of fighting, the political and the national will superseded all other priorities for the nation, and ultimately paved the way to eliminate the LTTE from Sri Lanka. However, Sri Lanka is still facing a threat to unity in the present post-conflict situation, of which pro-LTTE Tamil diasporic elements are disseminating Tamil separatist ideology to discredit the efforts of the government of Sri Lanka to bring sustainable peace.¹

The Tamil diaspora presently holds a “dormant posture” because the LTTE has ceased to exist. However, the Tamil diaspora continues to use the LTTE name as the symbol of the movement to achieve its final objective. In June 2009, Perinbananayakam Sivaparan (alias Nediyan), a zealous follower of the LTTE’s Head of International Network, formed the Tamil Eelam People’s Assembly (TEPA)/Tamil National Council (TNC) based on the LTTE’s ideology. In addition, Nediyan’s faction maintains a close link with the Global Tamil Forum.²

Presently, the aspirations of the pro-LTTE diaspora are to make every possible attempt to discredit the Sri Lankan government as well as the military for alleged war crimes. In addition, the diaspora seeks political autonomy, the declaration of Northern and Eastern Sri Lanka as a semi-autonomous Tamil region, and “total separation” from the central government in terms of political, socio-economic, military, and education constructs.³ Therefore, this study focuses on identifying the Tamil diaspora’s future ambitions involved in political and social activities and the future strategy of the government in managing the crisis to achieve sustainable peace in Sri Lanka.

¹ Sylvester Perera, “The Sri Lankan Civil War: A Personal Reminiscence,” *CTX Journal* 5 no.4 (November 2015), <https://globalecco.org/the-sri-lankan-civil-war-a-personal-reminiscence-col-sylvester-perera-sri-lankan-army>.

² “Evolution of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) International Network,” accessed September 20, 2015, <http://www.defence.lk/news/pdf/LTTE%20International%20Network.pdf>.

³ Ibid.

A. BACKGROUND

On February 4, 1948, Sri Lanka, or Ceylon as it was then called, gained its independence. The country boasts a religious and cultural heritage that can be traced back over a thousand years.⁴ Most of the current population can date their origins to the Aryans of North India or the Dravidians of South India, who arrived on the island around 500 BCE. Buddhism was introduced on the island around the time of Devanampiya (307–267 BCE).⁵ According to their history, the Sinhalese believe that the Tamils were a migrant community who arrived from India, the present Tamil Nadu, then the land of Sollee. The Tamil king from the Chola Dynasty from South India invaded Ceylon, now Sri Lanka, and ruled the country for 44 years, 205–161 BCE. After that time, the kings of the Sinhala nation staged several battles against Tamil kings and their forces to chase them out of the areas occupied by the Sinhala community. As the current author has indicated, the Tamils now claim this area to be the land of Eelam: “Tamils ... do not believe that they are a migrant community and view the North and East of Sri Lanka as their ancestral homeland.”⁶

Before independence in 1948, Ceylon was occupied by foreign powers, and the land had three different administrative areas—Ruhunu (south), Maya (north) and Pihity (central). When the Portuguese arrived in 1505 CE, they found the island divided into three kingdoms, two Sinhala kingdoms in the south and the Tamil Kingdom in the north. By 1697 CE, the Portuguese ruled the entire island except for the Kandyan kingdom, which they could not conquer. The desire to control the spice trade led the Dutch to challenge the Portuguese and drive them out of the island by 1658 CE, after which they handed over the administration of the island to the Dutch East India Company. At that time, the British were worried over the possible takeover of the port of Trincomalee by the French and negotiated over the status of the fort. The British slowly forced the Dutch

⁴ Rohan Gunaratna, *War & Peace in Sri Lanka: with a Post-Accord Report from Jaffna* (Colombo, Sri Lanka: Institute of Fundamental Studies, 1987), 56. Anthropological evidence suggests that human beings had first lived on the island some 30,000 years ago at the cave sites of Ratnapura, situated in Sabaragamuwa in Sri Lanka.

⁵ Ibid., 57.

⁶ Perera, “The Sri Lankan Civil War.”

off the island by 1795 CE and handed over administration to the British East India Company. The British also made determined efforts to conquer the Kandyan kingdom but failed. As a result of geographical location, the isolated kingdom developed a distinctive identity.⁷

The British converted Sri Lanka into a plantation economy, which led to the formation of a landed aristocracy, comprising the British and those loyal to them. However, the Sinhalese refused to work in the plantation sector, and the British brought South-Indian Tamil workers to fulfill their requirements. During this period, Sri Lankan cultural beliefs and traditions were neglected by British rulers due to hostilities. After independence, attempts were made to reassert Sinhala and Buddhism to a dominant position in the society, but these proved severely disruptive.⁸

When the British occupiers left in 1948, Tamils, who predominantly occupied the north, did not want to be under governance in which a majority of Sinhalese were in power. Tamil separatism, which continues to ravage Sri Lanka's stability, has deep-rooted and long-standing origins. The present-day crisis is only a manifestation of the strained Tamil–Sinhala relations in their pre- and post-independence histories.⁹ From the nineteenth century onward, Tamil and Sinhala historians have engaged in bitter debates for and against the demand of the Tamils in the north and the east of the island for a homeland. As Sinhala chauvinism rose after independence, Tamil irredentism had no choice but to keep pace. After 1956, the “Sinhala only” policy and gradual Sinhala colonization of traditional Tamil areas commenced in the north—particularly in Vavuniya, Batticaloa, Ampara, and Trincomalee, Sri Lanka.¹⁰ The Tamil-majority Jaffna peninsula could not prevent the influence of the Tamils in India (Tamil Nadu). The

⁷ Rohan Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: the Role of India's Intelligence Agencies* (Colombo, Sri Lanka: South Asian Network on Conflict Research, 1993), 55–87.

⁸ Janina Brutt-Griffler, “Class, Ethnicity, and Language Rights: An Analysis of British Colonial Policy in Lesotho and Sri Lanka and Some Implications for Language Policy,” *Journal of Language, Identity, and Education* 1, no. 3 (2002): 207–234, doi: 10.1207/S15327701JLIE0103_3.

⁹ Gunaratna, *War & Peace in Sri Lanka*, 65.

¹⁰ A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, *Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Vancouver, British Columbia: UBC Press, 2000), 84.

Tamils failed to gain legitimacy through peaceful *satyagraha* and *hartals* (passive resistance). Economic desolation and loss of faith in peaceful methods gave a boost to violent means. Militants rose to lead the people in these violent means while fighting among themselves for predominance and authority.¹¹

The Sri Lankan geo-strategic situation is a prime factor influencing Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict. Not only is the country located in proximity to its neighbor India, but the north and east are only a few miles away from Tamil Nadu, the home of more than 60 million Tamils. With support from the radical groups of Tamil Nadu, in 1976, Velupillai Prabhakaran formed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE). Later, the LTTE became the largest and most aggressive Tamil guerrilla organization, which depended on suicide attacks and an armed culture. Additionally, the LTTE did not intend to create a separate state in Sri Lanka but a greater Eelam adjoining to the State of Tamil Nadu in India (see Figure 1).¹²




Figure 1. Map of Greater Eelam¹³

¹¹ Wilson, *Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism*, 88–89.

¹² Perera, “The Sri Lankan Civil War.”

¹³ Source: Tamil Nadu Liberation Front “Tamil Nadu, Vishal Tamil Nadu, Tamil Desam or Greater Tamil Nadu” accessed August 20, 2015. <http://truehindu.tripod.com/veerappan.htm>.

Though the Tamil insurgency died down militarily in 2009, unrest has continued to grow under various conditions. The ethnic problem forced an exodus of many Tamils to India and rest of the world. They later formed themselves into a Tamil diaspora and the world Tamil Forum in an effort to mobilize all Tamils in the world for a common purpose. Today, the diaspora is the power behind separatism.¹⁴

B. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

What are the positive and negative impacts on sustainable peace in Sri Lanka from the political and social activities of the pro-LTTE members of the Tamil diaspora?

C. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

In the present post-conflict situation in Sri Lanka, the government is facing many challenges. The Tamil diaspora that is spread all over the world is on the verge of promulgating false ideology to discredit the efforts of the Sri Lankan government to bring about sustainable peace as a complete solution to its ethnic problem. In his book *When Counter Insurgency Wins*, Ahmed S. Hashim states that the Tamil diaspora “remains a politically active and sophisticated force seeking to leverage Western sympathy and resources in support of the quest for Eelam.”¹⁵ The Tamil political parties who are strongly backed by the pro-LTTE Tamil diaspora have failed to cooperate with each successive government in Sri Lanka to achieve their demands, which are contradictory to the will of the Sri Lanka’s government and Sinhalese ethnic majority. This is the major challenge faced by successive governments, internally and internationally. Additionally, mistrust has developed between the Tamils and Sinhalese over this period. Even after many political discussions, the Tamil diaspora’s political and social activities, the actions of the Tamil political parties, and the attitude of the Sinhalese majority have further

¹⁴ Perera, “The Sri Lankan Civil War.”

¹⁵ Ahmed Hashim, *When Counterinsurgency Wins: Sri Lanka’s Defeat of the Tamil Tigers* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 211.

exaggerated ethnic tensions in Sri Lanka. While analyzing the concerns of all major actors, it is necessary to identify the approaches to building confidence among the ethnic groups and to find an amicable and lasting solution to the ethnic problem.

This study is significant for identifying the social and political activities of the Tamil diaspora in various countries. Understanding both the positive and negative impacts of the political and social activities of the Tamil diaspora will inform how to bring about a lasting solution to the ethnic problem. Based on Louis Kriesberg's conflict resolution model, I hope to develop a model for analyzing the Sri Lankan post-conflict situation.¹⁶

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

Although Velupillai Prabakaran and Veerakathy Manivannam (alias Castro)—the top leadership of the LTTE—were killed by the Sri Lankan military, the international network of the LTTE still actively safeguards the interest of the Tamil diaspora. Although no single person is now in charge, a web of key individuals living in Western and European countries (see Table 1) continues to create political groups and facilitate coordinating centers to revamp and fund the network.¹⁷ It is against this backdrop that the Tamil separatist ideology in post-conflict Sri Lanka needs to be studied.

¹⁶ Louis Kriesberg, *Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 23.

¹⁷ Udeshi Amarasinghe, "Modus Operandi: Tamil diaspora and LTTE Organizations," Official Government News Portal of Sri Lanka Accessed August 11, 2015. <http://www.news.lk/features/item/1084-modus-operandi-tamil-diaspora-and-ltte-organisations>.

Table 1. Distribution of Tamil Diaspora¹⁸

Serial	Country	Tamil Diaspora
1	Canada	380,000
2	India	150,000
3	Great Britain	300,000
4	Germany	60,000
5	Australia	40,000
6	Switzerland	42,000
7	France	100,000
8	Netherlands	15,000
9	United States	35,0000
10	Italy	23,000
11	Malaysia	20,000
12	Norway	12,000
13	Denmark	7,000
14	New Zealand	3,000
15	Sweden	2,500
16	Belgium	800
17	Finland	700

Therefore, this chapter focuses on literature identifying the Tamil diaspora's past and present political and social activities as well as the future strategy of the government in managing the crisis to achieve sustainable peace in Sri Lanka.

1. Origin of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

The LTTE is known in history as one of the most ruthless terrorist organizations; the group controlled enough territory in Sri Lanka to become a de facto state with its own army, navy, and police, to include an air force equipped with light aircraft. In addition,

¹⁸ "Evolution of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) International Network," accessed September 20, 2015, <http://www.defence.lk/news/pdf/LTTE%20International%20Network.pdf>.

the LTTE owned a shipping line that ferried arms and ammunition to its fighting elements when it was not legitimately trading in cargo.¹⁹

Vast literature exists on the LTTE organization, covering its origins, recruitment methods, training, equipment, and the various roles it played. However, this study does not focus on details of the organization. It is of paramount importance to know about the relationship between the LTTE organization and the Tamil diaspora as it is directly related to this thesis. In *Tigers Vanquished*, M. R. Narayan Swamy claims that the LTTE was formed in 1976. As the leader of the organization, Vellupillai Prabhakaran played a key role in gaining maximum support from the Tamil diaspora. Initially, he assassinated many political and contemporary leaders of Tamil militant groups to become the sole representative of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka. Swamy writes, “After initial setbacks, Prabhakaran became the LTTE, and the LTTE became Prabhakaran.”²⁰ The current author’s personal experience coincides with Swamy’s book and is of particular use in formulating this thesis. The 1983 “Black July” riots constituted the biggest blunder by the extremist Sinhalese people in the south and created an opportunity for Prabhakaran to rebuild his organization. Previously, none of these Tamil militant groups that emerged in the northern part of Sri Lanka along with the LTTE had been able to muster anything more than twenty members. The LTTE had neither a well-timed program nor a systematic approach to build up its organization. In other words, the Tamil militancy, which waged a struggle for a separate homeland in Sri Lanka for over thirty years, had an accidental birth.

Along with the Tamil diaspora, the involvement of the international community in the Sri Lankan conflict extended worldwide, and an unfavorable situation arose in India. According to Swamy, until 1983, the state of Tamil Nadu (a southern state in India) unofficially and covertly provided support to the Tamils; limited ammunition, arms, and equipment were provided to the LTTE. Following the 1983 riots, however, India overtly gave support by giving up some of its territories to organize and prepare itself for an

¹⁹ M. R. Narayan Swamy, *The Tiger Vanquished: LTTE’s Story* (New Delhi, India: SAGE Publications, 2010), xix.

²⁰ Swamy, *The Tiger Vanquished*, 137.

armed struggle.²¹ This study agrees with Swamy's analysis of the Indian Research and Analysis Wing (RAW): India, being an ally of the socialist camp during the Cold War, played the role of external agency and enabled a proxy war in Sri Lanka. This seems to be the reason why the new government of Sri Lanka aligned with the West. India suspected the Sri Lankan government was adopting capitalistic policies, including North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) strategies, led by the United States. Subsequently, India tried to intervene in curbing militancy but had to face disastrous consequences, losing a large number of soldiers and a former prime minister to assassination.

Thereafter, India became a prominent figure in the international community over the Sri Lankan conflict. In this thesis, the current author discusses world opinion, India's foreign policy with Sri Lanka, and the agreements signed between the two governments to find a lasting solution to the ethnic issue.

2. What Is a Diaspora?

According to Hazel Smith and Paul Stares, "Diasporas are social groups that (i) settle and establish themselves in another country and (ii) are internally heterogeneous."²² Smith and Stares also explain that globalization has created a situation in which diasporas can play a significant role in a conflict. They are considered an important international political force, whose most significant characteristic is the variety of different roles they are liable to play in the conflict. Within the same conflict, the approaches of various individuals, groups, and their organizations differ and may contribute positively or negatively toward a continued conflict. Therefore, they can be peacemakers or peace-wreckers. These roles can best be understood by tracing their capacities and transnational opportunities.²³ In the Sri Lankan conflict, the identification and understanding of diaspora activities are critical to achieving sustainable peace. In this thesis, the author employs the aforementioned definition and the roles played by the Tamil diaspora.

²¹ Ibid., ivi.

²² Hazel Smith and Paul B. Stares, *Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers?* (New York: United Nations Publications, 2007), 5.

²³ Smith and Stares, *Diasporas in Conflict*, 9.

3. The Tamil Diaspora—Who Are They?

According to Christine Fair, the Tamil diaspora consists of many waves of migration since the British colonial period (1797–1948). During the British occupation, Tamils who were fluent in English migrated to Burma and the Federated Malay States for government job opportunities. Then, in 1956, after the government introduced a “Sinhala only” policy, a few thousand educated Tamils left Sri Lanka and settled in the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and the United States. Also, according to Fair, due to undesirable political situations that existed from time to time in Sri Lanka, some Tamil people were compelled to migrate.²⁴ Fair’s claim is accurate in that the Tamils migrated after independence purely on ethnic grounds. However, this study proposes that it was after the 1983 riots that the majority of Tamils left the country, both legally and illegally. These migrants initially maintained refugee status, demanding political asylum in Europe and Northern America. Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah confirms the UNHCR’s report that from 1980 to 1990, 256,307 Tamil Sri Lankans demanded asylum in Europe.²⁵ Subsequently, the majority of them obtained permanent residence in many countries around the world. Accordingly, the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora increased from 600,000 to 800,000 persons worldwide and started political and social activities in which it sought division in Sri Lanka.²⁶

Although there were about seventy-five million Tamil people in the world, none of the authors discuss the Tamil diaspora before 1983. Historically, the Tamil people are from South Asia, the majority of them living in the southern parts of India and the northern parts of Sri Lanka. However, many claim that the Tamil diaspora came into existence after the 1983 riots in Sri Lanka. In the same vein, Narayan Swamy says that the riots on July 23, 1983 riots were the turning point of the ethnic problem in Sri

²⁴ C. Christine Fair, “The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora: Sustaining Conflict and Pushing for Peace,” in *Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers*, ed. Hazel Smith and Paul B. Stares (New York: United Nations University Press, 2007), 172–195.

²⁵ Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, “Tamil diaspora Politics,” in *Encyclopedia of diasporas* (New York: Springer, 2005), 493.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 179.

Lanka.²⁷ It is necessary to understand what actually happened during the riots. According to Hashim, July 23, 1983 was the worst recorded day in Sri Lankan history, when community riots began and spread quickly all over the country. These riots occurred in response to an incident during which the LTTE ambushed and killed a Sri Lankan Army officer and twelve other rankers at Tirunelveli, Jaffna (a city adjacent to Jaffna, the main city of northern Sri Lanka). This was the major blunder made by the Sinhalese extremists in Sri Lanka. Even the government was unable to effectively control the situation. The LTTE and the Tamil diaspora have repeatedly used the 1983 incident to justify their cause of separate statehood.²⁸ The riot is one of the important incidents that relates to this thesis.

The entire Tamil diaspora does not work as a pro-LTTE element struggling to create a separate state in Sri Lanka. According to the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defense, the “present LTTE/Pro-LTTE international network can be broadly categorized into five groups.”²⁹ Visvanathan Rudrakumaran, LTTE militant and the international legal head of the LTTE in the United States, is constantly working toward establishing the “government in exile,” the Transnational Government for Tamil Eelam (TGTE). Perinbananayakam Sivaparan (alias Nediyan) formed a radical group known as the Tamil Eelam People’s Assembly (TEPA)/Tamil National Council (TNC) to perpetuate Vellupillai Prabhakaran’s ideology and tactics. Rev. Fr. S. J. Emmanuel continues to lead the Global Tamil Forum (GTF), and Segarapaillai Vinayagamoorthy (aliases Vinayagam and Arivalagan) founded the LTTE Headquarters Group in the early part of 2010. Apart from these, Suren Surendraran heads the British Tamil Forum (BTF) based in the United Kingdom. According to the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defense, “Though the role, task and policies of these groups, invariably overlapped, all these group are working towards a

²⁷ Swamy, *The Tiger Vanquished*, 12–19.

²⁸ Ruwan M. Jayatunge, “The Black July 1983 that Created a Collective Trauma,” Lankaweb, April 27, 2010, <http://www.lankaweb.com/news/items/2010/04/27/the-black-july-1983-that-created-a-collective-trauma/>.

²⁹ “Evolution of Liberation Tigers,” Ministry of Defense.

common agenda of establishing a separate state.”³⁰ Therefore, this study incorporates only these five factions, and people who are involved with these five factions are identified as the pro-LTTE diaspora.

4. Eelam Wars and the Tamil Diaspora

The Tamil diaspora is one of the key factors for the existence of the LTTE organization that had ruthlessly fought for more than three decades before it was vanquished. In line with the previous authors, Stephen L. Battle discusses the involvement and contribution made to the LTTE organization during various stages of the conflict. According to Battle, since 1983, the Tamil diaspora has raised its voice in the international arena and lobbied for international sympathy and support in the form of financing and materiel for the war effort. By 1998, the Tamil diaspora contributed twenty-four to thirty-six million USD to the LTTE, and this figure increased yearly.³¹ In the latter stages of the conflict, the contribution reached \$200–\$300 million USD annually.³² Fair supports this argument and categorizes the diaspora’s contribution into four aspects: economic, political, military, and socio-cultural. She also identifies the Tamil diaspora as the “economic backbone of the militant campaign.”³³ In the current author’s view, the LTTE had the capacity to combat the Indian Army in Sri Lanka to an extent. Therefore, the LTTE was able to convince Tamil expatriates living abroad both in refugee status and otherwise that it was prepared to achieve its desired goal through an armed struggle. In the meantime, the LTTE engaged in various propaganda campaigns for two causes.³⁴ The first was to justify demands for political asylum and citizenship. The second was to support the separatist struggle in Sri Lanka.

In 2007, the Sri Lankan government began the final offensives against the LTTE. The operation began after both parties failed to negotiate a settlement during the fifth

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Stephen L. Battle, “Lessons in Legitimacy: The LTTE End-game of 2007–2009” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 25.

³² Ibid.

³³ Fair, “The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora,” 181.

³⁴ “Evolution of Liberation Tigers,” Ministry of Defense.

round of peace negotiations. In his book, Swamy argues that Selvarasa Pathmanathan (aliases Kumaran Pathmanathan or KP), the successor of the late Anton Balasingham and newly appointed head of the international relations department, made every possible attempt to stop ongoing operations. He was under the impression that the LTTE organization was going to be defeated by the Sri Lankan military. However, the Sri Lankan government did not adequately disrupt the LTTE's established links with the West and Europe through the Tamil diaspora. The LTTE expected assistance from the West and Europe in the form of diplomatic interference during the final phase of operations to gain time.³⁵ Having failed to get support before the LTTE was vanquished, the Tamil diaspora has made all possible attempts to discredit the government and security forces over the issue of casualties and deaths during the final battle.³⁶ Therefore, the author, using conflict resolution models (outlined in following sections), explores the ways and means to address the postwar conflict between the government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the Tamil diaspora.

Although the GoSL eliminated the terror outfit completely from Sri Lanka, many scholars have argued that Sri Lanka still faces a threat to unity in the present post-conflict situation. Hashim, for example, argues that though the shooting war in Sri Lanka has terminated, the conflict has not.³⁷ The current author agrees with these scholars and argues this claim later in the thesis. In fact, after 2009, few incidents occurred in Sri Lanka that were related to the remnants of LTTE. In an article for the *Daily Mirror* on April 19, 2014, D.B.J. Jeyaraj recounts an incident of LTTE resurgence by three ex-LTTE activists, who were funded and motivated by pro-LTTE diaspora elements. However, they were killed by the Sri Lankan Army in Vedivaitakallu in the Northern Province in April 2014.³⁸ In the meantime, according to Chanaka Bandarage, a United Nations (UN) resolution was passed against the government of Sri Lanka over alleged

³⁵ Swamy, *The Tiger Vanquished*, 164.

³⁶ Hashim, *When Counterinsurgency Wins*, 214.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ D.B.S. Jeyaraj, "Third Abortive Diaspora-backed Attempt to Revive the LTTE, *Daily Mirror*, April 26, 2014, <http://mirrorcitizen.dailymirror.lk/2014/04/26/third-abortive-diaspora-backed-attempt-to-revive-the-ltte/>.

war crimes. The Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE) is understood to be the driving force behind this resolution that alleges the Sri Lankan Army violated human rights at the UNHCR sessions in 2012, 2013, and 2014.³⁹ Consequently, the TGTE planned to remove the generalized system of preferences (GSP) and tax concessions for the European Union (EU)'s garment exports. The diplomatic isolation at the Commonwealth sessions was another negative issue for the government of Sri Lanka due to the involvement of the TGTE in Sri Lankan affairs.⁴⁰ According to Henry Ridgwell, in 2013, the heads of state of Canada and India among others refrained from participating in the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM).⁴¹ Notably, in addition to affecting world leaders, the TGTE is on the verge of strengthening the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) as the sole representative of Tamil people in Sri Lanka. Later chapters describe in detail how the TGTE poses a threat to Sri Lanka's economy, security, territorial integrity, and sovereignty.

5. South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commissions and Creation of South Sudan

On July 9, 2011, independence was declared in South Sudan. In 1983, Sudanese President Gaafar Nimeiry declared all Sudan, including the southern region, an Islamic state and governed by Sharia law. However, the enforcement of Islamic and Arabic identity on the South Sudanese people was rejected by the non-Islamic majority inhabiting the region. The mistrust between North and South Sudan began, and South Sudanese autonomy was blocked. As a result, rebel groups emerged to fight for independence against the Sudanese government.⁴² They fought for decades, and an estimated 2.5 million people died in the conflict while another four million were

³⁹ Chanaka Bandarage, "UNHCR Sessions in Geneva in March 2014," Lankaweb, January 13, 2014, <http://www.lankaweb.com/news/items/2014/01/13/unhcr-sessions-in-geneva-in-march-2014/>.

⁴⁰ "Sri Lanka Hardens Stand on GSP Plus," *Tamil Guardian*, October 29, 2008, <http://www.tamilguardian.com/article.asp?articleid=1959>.

⁴¹ Henry Ridgwell, "Some Boycott Sri Lanka Commonwealth Meeting," *Voice of America*, November 11, 2013, <http://www.voanews.com/content/some-boycott-sri-lanka-commonwealth-meeting/1788057.html>.

⁴² "Behind the Red Line: Political Repression in Sudan," Human Rights Watch, May 1996, <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1996/Sudan.htm>.

displaced.⁴³ Subsequently, in January 2011, in accordance with a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) at a referendum held on the independence of South Sudan, nearly 99 percent of South Sudanese voted in favor of an independent state, that is, not to be annexed by Sudan.⁴⁴ Even after the declaration of a separate state, the conflict remained unresolved.

The comparison between Sri Lanka and South Sudan is problematic due to different geographies, societies, and cultures. Shenali D. Waduge also argues against the comparison, stating that as opposed to the South Sudanese, the Tamils are not living confined to North and East Sri Lanka but scattered all over the island along with other communities. Additionally, the Tamils live in peace and harmony with the majority Sinhalese in the rest of the country.⁴⁵ Confirming Waduge's argument, the total Tamil population in Sri Lanka is 3,113,247, out of which only 1,597,276 reside in the North and East.⁴⁶ Therefore, Waduge claims that the Tamil diaspora's demand for a separate state in Sri Lanka, referring to the referendum that created South Sudan, is invalid.⁴⁷ Also, the total area of Sudan (before separation) is forty times bigger than Sri Lanka.⁴⁸ This aforementioned data will be considered when analyzing the demand of the Tamil diaspora for a separate state.

The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC) is important to this study because the Sri Lankan government refers to this as a model for bringing a solution to its post-conflict tensions. Equivalent to a full-fledged court, the TRC was established by the South African government in 1995 to help its people in their

⁴³ "Ongoing Displacement and Conflict despite Independence," last modified February 5, 2015, <https://www.lutheranworld.org/content/south-sudan>.

⁴⁴ Maggie Fick, "Over 99 Pct in Southern Sudan Vote for Secession," *USA Today*, January 30, 2011, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/topstories/2011-01-30-2052877353_x.htm.

⁴⁵ Shenali D. Waduge, "Sri Lankan Tamils Learn Lessons from What Happened to Sudan," *Lankaweb*, January 4, 2014, <http://www.lankaweb.com/news/items/2014/01/04/sri-lankan-tamils-learn-lessons-from-what-happened-to-sudan/>.

⁴⁶ "Lanka Census of Population and Housing, 2011," accessed April 12, 2016, <http://www.statistics.gov.lk/PopHouSat/CPH2011/index.php?fileName=pop42&gp=Activities&tpl=3>.

⁴⁷ Waduge, "Sri Lankan Tamils Learn Lessons."

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

reconciliation and to uncover the truth about human rights violations. Along the same line, in a CNN interview, former Sri Lankan High Commissioner to the United Kingdom (UK) Chris Nonis explains the main purpose of this implementation was to gather facts from both victims and perpetrators of apartheid but not to pursue punitive actions for past offenses.⁴⁹ Therefore, this commission differs from other commissions like the Nuremberg trials in which Nazis were prosecuted for crimes against humanity after World War II.⁵⁰ President Maithripala Sirisena highlighted the South African model to find a solution to the Sri Lankan tensions because an important feature of the TRC was its openness and transparency.⁵¹ The current author discusses the TRC and analyzes the president's manifesto together with Lesson Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) recommendations made during former President Mahinda Rajapaksa's regime.

6. Louis Kriesberg's Model of Conflict Cycle

There are different models that attempt to explain the relationship between conflict and peace. It is extremely difficult, however, to identify an exact model for the Sri Lankan conflict because the situation is unique. Hence, I will discuss Kriesberg's model related to the subject from escalation to resolution. I will compare and contrast the details and ideas of this model to create a new model that suits the analysis of the Sri Lankan situation.

⁴⁹ "Sri Lankan High Commissioner to the UK Dr. Chris Nonis CNN Interview about Sri Lanka War Crimes," YouTube video, 7:00, from a CNN interview of Dr. Chris Nonis, posted by "Chamara Kodithuwakku," November 16, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Iw_Ui-1QI8U.

⁵⁰ "Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)," last modified April 15, 2016, <http://www.sahistory.org.za/tonic/truth-and-reconciliation-commission-trc>

⁵¹ "Statement by Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera at the 30th Session of the Human Rights Council in Geneva," Embassy of Sri Lanka, September 16, 2015, <http://slembassyusa.org/news/statement-by-foreign-minister-mangala-samaraweera-at-the-30th-session-of-the-human-rights-council-in-geneva/>.




Figure 2. Conflict Cycle⁵²

Louis Kriesberg's model for the constructive conflict from escalation to resolution, shown in Figure 2, gives a comprehensive explanation as to the causes of diverse social conflicts. Kriesberg gives a series of stages for the base emergence of a conflict, which includes various factors. Initially, a conflict begins when one party tries to manifest the belief that his goal of conflict is incompatible with that of his adversary's. In another case, the adversary tries to pursue another incompatible goal. This sort of thinking expresses the desire of one adversary to go against the other. Thus, the escalation of a conflict can exist. According to Kriesberg, these conflicts are liable to escalate or de-escalate on a time frame and can vary in magnitude. Finally, the outcome may be a total termination. The re-emergence of a fresh conflict cannot be ruled out, according to Kriesberg, who introduces a cycle of events. Moreover, environmental factors can cause another conflict to re-emergence.⁵³

According to the Kriesberg conflict cycle, not all stages of conflicts are identical or follow in the same sequence. However, the current conflict cycle gives a method for understanding the mode of the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict, and it also helps the

⁵² Source: Kriesberg, *Constructive Conflicts*, 23.

⁵³ Kriesberg, *Constructive Conflicts*, 23.

adversaries make policies and recommendations to settle the dispute. In Figure 2, short arrows indicate the external (the Tamil diaspora) and internal (the TNA) factors based on the respective adversaries. The author considers that Sri Lanka is in the reconciliation process after many the escalations and de-escalations over three decades. Presently, the government considers the Tamil diaspora and the TNA its main adversaries in either the peaceful or violent outcome. Also, according to Kreisberg, a relationship can be identified by considering conflicting and complementary interests. Therefore, the current author uses Kriesberg's theory in the analysis to identify complementary and conflicting interests of the Tamil diaspora, the TNA, and the government of Sri Lanka against their respective opponents. Kreisberg contends that integration advisory is the best method to bring about solutions to social problems. Therefore, final recommendations consider how best to integrate the Tamil diaspora and the TNA into the administration while defending the interests of the government.⁵⁴

7. SWOT Analysis

In the past, SWOT analysis has been a method to assess strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats in business and industries. The use of SWOT analysis in community work is also employed to combat its internal and external adversaries. However, after identifying the objective or end state, SWOT analysis can also be used to make decisions in non-profit organizations, including governments. Furthermore, this analysis can be used in pre-crisis planning and preventive crisis management. Hence, the author uses SWOT analysis to identify the negative and positive impacts of the Tamil diaspora in achieving sustainable peace in Sri Lanka. Then, the author gives recommendations based on analysis to counter threats, overcome weaknesses, exploit opportunities, and maximize the strengths of the government in finding a lasting solution to the ethnic problem.⁵⁵ The elements used in Chapter IV's analysis are shown in Figure 3.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 138.

⁵⁵ David Jacobsen, Paul Eggen, and Donald Kauchak, *Methods for Teaching: A Skills Approach* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993).



Figure 3. SWOT Analysis⁵⁶

8. The Demands of the Tamil National Alliance and the Government's Proposals

In this thesis, the author has collected and analyzed information in detail on the demand of the main Tamil political party, the TNA, which is primarily linked to the Tamil diaspora. In this regard, the author focuses primarily on the objectives considered by the Sri Lankan government in terms of the 13th Amendment “13 plus dialogue” and the recommendations of the LLRC report.

The TNA, based on conflict resolution in the present context, has demanded “the right of self-determination[,] ... merged ... northern and eastern provinces based on a federal structure[,] ... devolution of power[,] ... direct foreign investment in the north-east[, and] ... avenues for a tertiary education”⁵⁷ On these issues, the Sri Lankan government has held sessions on several occasions, considering a justifiable resolution to counter the demands of the TNA. The 13th Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka

⁵⁶ Source: Wikipedia, s.v. “SWOT analysis,” last modified September 30, 2007. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:SWOT_en.svg.

⁵⁷ “Our Stand on the Political Solution,” accessed August 23, 2015. http://tnapolitics.org/?page_id=33.

was created to give powers to the provincial councils. The amendment made Sinhala and Tamil the official languages on July 29, 1987. Subsequently, on November 14, 1987, the Sri Lankan parliament passed the 13th Amendment to the 1978 Constitution, and Provincial Council Act 42 of 1987 was established. Prior to the end of the conflict, former President Mahinda Rajapakse held a dialogue on the “13 plus” with the authorities of the Indian government.⁵⁸ Consequently, the intervention of the Tamil diaspora, supported by the TNA, brought the matter to higher levels, and the matter was taken up for discussion at the UNHCR sessions in 2012, 2013, and 2014. However, the implementation of the LLRC’s recommendations by the government of Sri Lanka is continuing through the National Plan of Action (NPoA).⁵⁹

The main demand of the TNA on the 13th Amendment, as supported by the Indian government, is critical because of the reluctance of full implementation by the previous government. With the formation of the new government, the subject of conflict resolution is considered a vital issue to be addressed immediately.

E. CONCLUSION

The LTTE waged a continuous war against seven successive governments in Sri Lanka. Although it was militarily defeated in May 2009, its separatist ideology has continued to sustain the Tamil diaspora and has become a serious threat to the economy, security, and sovereignty of Sri Lanka. The Tamil diaspora’s separatist ideology shares common features with the diasporas in other world conflicts and shows connections between different stages in the conflicts and their outcomes. The Tamil diaspora’s political and social activities as well as its networking, therefore, stand unique among other global conflicts since there exists no historical legitimacy.

The challenge is to preserve Sri Lankan territorial integrity and continue with the integration process of ethnic groups without damaging the sovereignty of the state.

⁵⁸ Sugeeswara Senadhira, “Sri Lanka and the 13th Amendment: What is ‘13 Plus’?” Institute of Peace Conflict Studies, July 11, 2013, <http://www.ipcs.org/article/south-asia/ipcs-debate-sri-lanka-and-the-13th-amendment-what-is-4034.html>.

⁵⁹ Nimal Wijedasa, “Recommendations of LLRC Report and Implementation Proposals of National Plan of Action,” DBSJeyaraj.com, July 29, 2012, <http://dbsjeyaraj.com/dbsj/archives/8802>.

Therefore, it is essential to study existing literature that identifies the demands of Tamils in Sri Lanka along with the influences, activities, and aspirations of the Tamil diaspora. Then, the thesis analyzes the findings with proposals and existing agreements of the Sri Lankan government. Finally, the thesis gives recommendations toward finding a lasting solution to the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. A systematic study of this situation, therefore, is of immense use to the state machinery that strives to counter these challenges. Thus, the author focuses on developing a future strategy for managing the crisis through the Sri Lankan government working with the Sri Lankan military to achieve sustainable peace in the country.

F. METHODOLOGY

This study specifies and offers critical insight into secondary literature that has been written by eminent scholars, academicians, writers, researchers, think tanks, and journals of eminent institutions and organizations. Extensive use of the Internet has also been undertaken to supplement and update the research. The author cannot gain access to pro-LTTE Tamil diaspora or members of the TNA to obtain first-hand information. Therefore, the author will focus on the following methodology:

- Though the Pro-LTTE Tamil diaspora has spread in many countries throughout the world, the author focuses on social and political activities of the Tamil diaspora solely in the United States, Canada, and the UK. The research discusses the detailed political and social activities of five pro-LTTE Tamil diaspora groups, namely, the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE), the Tamil Eelam People's Assembly (TEPA), the Global Tamil Forum (GTF), the British Tamil Forum (BTF), and the former combatant/intelligence group. Additionally, this study focuses on the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil National Alliance, which is considered the main political representative of the Tamil diaspora.
- The study, then, analyzes the social and political activities of the Tamil diaspora and the stance of the Sri Lankan government, using the conceptual model developed from Kreisberg's literature and SWOT analysis. The research identifies respective conflicting and complementary interests of the Tamil diaspora, the TNA, and the government against their respective adversaries and, then, identifies strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats to the Sri Lankan government. Finally, the author identifies the negative and positive impacts of the Tamil diaspora in the reconciliation process as the outcome of the analysis.

- This study also incorporates the issue of the South Sudan referendum and South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) report in the discussion and the analysis of the Tamil diaspora's the and TNA's interests.
- Finally, the study provides recommendations for a lasting solution to the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, based on elements of national power: diplomacy, information and technology, military, and economy (DIME). Thus, the author focuses on developing a future strategy for the Sri Lankan government to manage the ethnic conflict and achieve sustainable peace in Sri Lanka.

II. THE TAMIL DIASPORA'S ORGANIZATIONS AND GLOBAL ACTIVITIES, THE STANCE OF SRI LANKA, AND THE TAMIL NATIONAL ALLIANCE

This chapter focuses on identifying the current political and international network of the pro-Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) Tamil diaspora, its political and social activities, and its objectives as well as the government's future strategy to manage the crisis to achieve sustainable peace in Sri Lanka. The perspectives of the Tamil diaspora and the Tamil National Alliance, the leading Tamil political party in Sri Lanka, are crucial in achieving a lasting solution in Sri Lanka; thus, an understanding of the potential post-conflict situation in Sri Lanka and the identification of its significant challenges are an important part of this chapter.

A. THE TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL EELAM

The Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE) was formed in the United States in 2010 by a group among the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora with the intention of creating a separate state within Sri Lanka. Visvanathan Rudrakumaran, a close associate of the LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, is the Prime Minister of the Transnational Government. The TGTE has established offices in most European countries where the Tamil diaspora resides, maintaining a close connection with Tamil political action groups. Its goal is the creation of a separate state, Tamil Eelam, in Sri Lanka. Rudrakumaran has begun to establish close links with the Tamil diaspora and its other organizations in the world. In 2010, the TGTE had its first election to select 135 members its so-called "parliament." However, during the election, over eighty-five percent of the Tamil voters refrained from voting. Subsequently, only one-third of the loyal members voted for the prime minister (PM) and the ministers. Rudrakumaran's policies were not acceptable to the rival party leader of another faction called the Tamil Coordinating Committee (TCC), another ideologue who opted to remain independent in order to grab power. Therefore, the TGTE's leadership is unpopular among most members of the

Tamil diaspora, especially to those who did not accept Rudrakumaran's role in the group. Figure 4 illustrates the organization of the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE).




Figure 4. The Organization of the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam⁶⁰

⁶⁰ Source: Amarasinghe, "Modus Operandi."

The mission statement of the TGTE is quoted as follows:

The Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam is a political formation to win the freedom of the Tamil people on the basis of their fundamental political principles of Nationhood, Homeland and Right of self-determination. At present, the Tamil people have absolutely no prospect of articulating their political aspirations or of exercising their fundamental rights in their homeland itself. The Sri Lankan government, through legal impediments, military occupation and murder is strangling the Tamil people's aspirations and their political rights.⁶¹

On the TGTE's official website, the organization lists its objectives. The following is a brief description of each:

- Coordinating all Tamil groups to achieve the Tamil political aspirations embedded in the 1977 mandate of the Vaddukoddai Resolution and Thimpu Principles;
- Advocating to achieve aspirations to regain "sovereignty and right to self-determination, articulated by the Tamil leadership";⁶²
- "Articulating positions for negotiations with the Sinhala nation";⁶³
- "Establishing direct links with foreign Governments and other international organizations";⁶⁴
- "Working for the social, economic and cultural well-being of more than one million members of the Tamil Diaspora";⁶⁵
- "Building a political program with the participation of Muslim representatives, taking into account that the diversity of Tamil and Muslim regions has been used as a threat in the past against the realization of the Tamils' right to self-determination";⁶⁶
- "In the case of promoting the interest of the Tamil people living in the North and East of Sri Lanka and the diaspora, liaising with international non-governmental organizations to ensure the physical survival and safety from physical abuse of Tamil children and ensuring the reuniting of the

61 Amarasinghe, "Modus Operandi."

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid.

family members separated during the conflict. Another concern is ensuring the return of the thousands of Tamils held in camps in their homes and obtaining justice for those who have committed genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.”⁶⁷

In 2015, the TGTE orchestrated a worldwide postcard campaign calling for the release of Sri Lankan Tamil prisoners connected to the armed conflict that ended in 2009. Over 200 Tamils have been held as postwar detainees in Sri Lankan prisons. Some of them have been in the prisons for over 12 years without any formal charge. These prisoners went on hunger strikes on two occasions, October 12, 2012 and November 7, 2015. The Sri Lankan government later reassured that their cases would be considered and heard without much delay. Given this assurance, the prisoners suspended their 2015 hunger strike. By this time, some of the POWs had fallen badly ill. They resumed their hunger strike again on December 15, 2015 as the government had not kept its promise. The TGTE feels that the Sri Lankan government should honor its promises given to the POWs, which was the reason the previous hunger strike was suspended.⁶⁸

The latest campaign of the TGTE centered on demanding justice for Tamils allegedly killed in Sri Lanka during the conflict. The TGTE favors imposing penalties on the Sri Lankan government through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and has gone to the extent of meeting Prince Zeid, the head of the UNHCR, to voice its appreciation for his bold decision in appointing a special hybrid court to conduct an inquiry. To publicize its efforts, the TGTE declared a “Tamil National Day of Mourning” to coincide with the opening of the 30th session of the UNHCR in Geneva, which concluded on May 18, 2016, the seventh anniversary of the TGTE. The TGTE chose these dates to emphasize its struggle for justice against the purported Tamil annihilation by Sri Lanka. The TGTE took this action because it was not confident about the domestic investigation proposed by the Sri Lankan government. The organization has also dedicated a separate team of international judges, lawyers, and human rights

⁶⁷ Amarasinghe, “Modus Operandi.”

⁶⁸Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam, “Sri Lanka: Release Tamil Prisoners of War – Worldwide Postcard Campaign Launched by TGTE,” *EIN News*, December 16, 2015, http://www.einnews.com/pr_news/302116263/sri-lanka-release-tamil-prisoners-of-war-worldwide-postcard-campaign-launched-by-tgte.

specialists to monitor the proceedings in Sri Lanka. Also, TGTE officials have requested that the commissioner turn over evidence available for prosecution under universal jurisdiction.⁶⁹ It seems that Sri Lanka is still facing a challenge from separatist groups in the post-conflict situation, whereby the TGTE is making strong attempts to propagate its Tamil ideology while discrediting the government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) on alleged human right violations, which are analyzed in Chapter III. Also, the TGTE is currently engaged in many political and social activities to influence the West and European countries to implement the UNHCR resolutions against the GoSL.

The TGTE's overall objective, however, is to achieve a "Tamil homeland and self-determination."⁷⁰ The TGTE strongly advocates for implementing self-determination based on the Vaddukoddai Resolution headed by S. J. V. Chelvanayakam of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) on May 14, 1976⁷¹ as well as the Thimpu Talks held on July 13, 1985, which established the main criteria of all the deliberations and declarations with regard to a separate nation for Tamils in Sri Lanka.⁷² The TGTE disseminates its propaganda worldwide, targeting youth segments to achieve its strategic objective.⁷³ Although the LTTE was militarily defeated, the TGTE stands for the same ideology of a separate state in Sri Lanka through its various social and political activities. From its actions, it seems evident that the TGTE has not given up the radical ideology of the LTTE's late leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, provoking the Tamil community in Sri Lanka. The LTTE's strategy to accomplish this, however, failed with tragic consequences over the last three decades. Therefore, Chapter III explores how the Sri Lankan government can best influence the diaspora to abandon its ideology of separatism.

⁶⁹ Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam, "'Trees for Justice' Campaign Launched by TGTE to Demand Justice for Tamils Killed in Sri Lanka," *EIN News*, September 14, 2015, http://world.einnews.com/pr_news/286289079/trees-for-justice-campaign-launched-by-tgte-to-demand-justice-for-tamils-killed-in-sri-lanka.

⁷⁰ "Tamil Eelam: Right to Self Determination," Tamil Nation.org, May 14, 1976, <http://www.tamilnation.co/selfdetermination/tamileelam/7605vaddukodai.htm>.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² "Thimpu Talks - July/August 1985," Tamil Nation.org, August 12, 1985, <http://www.tamilnation.co/conflictresolution/tamileelam/85thimpu/thimpu12.htm>.

⁷³ Amarasinghe, "Modus Operandi."

The TGTE's other main goal is to discredit the Sri Lankan government and its military. The TGTE claims that the Sri Lankan state itself stands accused of genocide against the Tamils. The interesting highlights of the aforementioned areas are published on the TGTE's website and in the mass media. These accusations criticize the Sri Lankan government of diluting the alleged human rights violations; Sri Lankan Northern Provincial Council Chief Minister Vigneshvaran and the Tamilnadu government both favor the TGTE's stance. Rajavarothiam Sampanthan's alignment with the government agenda while serving as the leader of the opposition party, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), seems questionable. The implementation of the UNHCR resolution has also been included in the TNA's list of tasks to accomplish.⁷⁴ Chapter III explores finding different views to approach reasonable and amicable resolutions that are acceptable to both parties.

B. THE GLOBAL TAMIL FORUM

In February 2010, the Global Tamil Forum (GTF) was formed for the cause of Eelam, coordinating and rallying all of the Tamil diaspora's factions that struggled for justice against the Sri Lankan military's alleged war crimes. The GTF is an organization allegedly in control of over 15 pro-LTTE Tamil diaspora groups around the globe. Rev. Fr. S. J. Emmanuel, a close associate of LTTE chief Velupillai Prabhakaran, was appointed as head of the GTF because he was a religious dignitary and the candidate most trusted by the international community due to his intellectual and religious credentials. The GTF followed the approach of another group called the British Tamil Forum (BTF) in the United Kingdom (UK), which exercises power by influencing key political parties through a few local politicians in parliament. Both the GTF and the BTF work closely with two other LTTE fronts, the Tamil for Conservative Party (TCP) and Tamils for Labor Party (TLP), which have worked closely in lobbying political support in the UK, Europe, and other Western countries. Today, the GTF plays a critical role in uniting all other LTTE groups under one umbrella to establish a separate state while also creating an environment conducive to radical groups continuing their operations. The GTF critically sidelines human-rights violation investigations in Sri Lanka and is

⁷⁴Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam, "'Trees for Justice' Campaign."

regarded by state actors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as a credible diaspora organization. As such, its involvement with international advocacy and its stance as a partner for peace in cooperation with state actors and key NGOs is noteworthy. Figure 5 shows the Global Tamil Forum's organization.




Figure 5. Global Tamil Forum Organization⁷⁵

The mission statement of the GTF is quoted as follows:

Our mission was shaped by the needs and priorities of the immediate aftermath of the war and has been driven by the need to:

Help rebuild the lives of a community devastated by the conflict;

Hold those responsible for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity to account and ensure justice for the innocent victims of the conflict; and

Facilitate international engagement for the Tamil political representatives from Sri Lanka to enhance the prospect of ensuring a just and lasting political settlement.⁷⁶

⁷⁵ Amarasinghe, "Modus Operandi."

⁷⁶ "About Us," accessed January 12, 2016, <http://www.globaltamilforum.org>.

On the GTF's official website, the organization list its objectives. The following is a brief description of each objective as listed on the organization's website:

The creation of an independent, international war crimes accountability mechanism;

A negotiated political settlement that ends Tamil marginalization. GTF, along with other Diaspora groups and Tamil representatives in Sri Lanka, are working towards a Tamil Common Declaration, which will state the conditions conducive to a political settlement that addresses the underlying grievances of the Tamil people;

The resettlement of IDPs [internationally displaced persons] to their places of origin;

An investigation into the fate and location of persons reported to have been disappeared;

The publication of a detainee database list;

The demilitarization of Tamil areas and the restoration of complete civil administration to all militarized government departments and national institutions;

The end of the Sinhalisation of Tamil majority areas, with immediate effect;

... Engage[ment] with civil society in South of Sri Lanka, in order to facilitate better understanding of each communities concerns and problems on the island.⁷⁷

Leader Rev. Fr. S. J. Emmanuel seems to be the key figure in coordinating with the NGOs and leading countries to establish an effective narrative to convince moderate Tamils to accept the GTF's ideology. The GTF has realized that the separatist movement's relationship with India is a crucial factor since the country is a superpower, and over 70 million Tamils live there. The GTF has connections with United Nations (UN) Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, UK Prime Minister David Cameron, members of the African National Congress, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, and other relevant diplomats across the world who advocate for peacebuilding.⁷⁸ The assassination of the

⁷⁷ "About Us," accessed January 12, 2016, <http://www.globaltamilforum.org>.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

former Indian Premier Rajeev Gandhi had a negative effect on the ideology and public image of the LTTE.⁷⁹ This political blowback forced separatist groups to take special precautions in creating feasible and smooth grounds in recovering their lost image by using a diplomatic approach with Indian higher authorities. Thereby, the GTF was under the impression that lobbying the 70 million members of the Tamil population in the south Indian region was its best course of action.

C. BRITISH TAMILS FORUM

The British Tamils Forum (BTF) was designated in 2006 to mobilize the diaspora in support of the Tamil Communal in the United Kingdom. The BTF is the largest Tamil diaspora organization, closely working with the Tamil community in the UK. Initially, the BTF's primary intention was to help the LTTE and Sri Lankan Tamils with their issues. As an advocacy group, the BTF coordinated matters with British parliamentarians and non-governmental organizations to bring Sri Lankan issues into their agenda.⁸⁰ The BTF's ideologies tally closely with the TGTE's and the GTF's; however, its approach is more politically motivated than radical or extremist. The BTF's mission statement is quoted as follows:

To harness the skills and the knowledge of the members of the forum, well-wishers and others including the mainstream decision makers in the UK to alleviate the sufferings of the Tamils in the Island of Sri Lanka and to further their right to self-determination within the democratic framework under pinned by the international law, covenants and conventions.⁸¹

On the BTF's official website, the organization lists its objectives as follows:

- To educate the British public and government personnel working on humanitarian, political, and economic issues regarding Tamils in Sri Lanka
- To make the British public understand the injustices caused and discrimination against Tamils in Sri Lanka since independence⁸²

⁷⁹ Swamy, *The Tiger Vanquished*, xix.

⁸⁰ Amarasinghe, "Modus Operandi."

⁸¹ "About," accessed January 11, 2016, <http://tamilsforum.co.uk/about>.

⁸² Ibid.

- To “enable British Tamils to advance their social and cultural well-being”⁸³

Presently, the BTF is responsible for organizing various political and social activities designed to educate individual Tamils as well as community organizations to highlight perceived criminal acts against Tamils committed by the Sri Lankan military. This organization was significant in carrying out covert operations under the pretext of peace building. Another feature seen here is the BTF’s maintenance of a low profile, advancing the Tamil separatist agendas through democratic means.⁸⁴ The group even went to the extent of addressing issues with higher authorities of decision-making in the British political forum to advance the social and cultural well-being of Tamil society in Britain and Sri Lanka. In 2009, a London demonstration of nearly 100,000 people was organized by the BTF to protest against the genocide of Tamils at the final battle against LTTE in Mullative, Sri Lanka. On January 31, 2014, the BTF held another conference focusing on land-grab issues with the participation of some speakers and international delegates.⁸⁵ The end state of the BTF’s strategy seems to be maintaining the claim of human rights violations and advocating for punishing the Sri Lankan military for the alleged genocide of the Tamils.

D. THE TAMIL EELAM PEOPLE’S ASSEMBLY

In 2009, the Tamil Eelam People’s Assembly (TEPA) was formed by Perinbananayakam Sivaparan (known by his alias, Nediyanan), the former international coordinator of the International Secretariat of the LTTE based in Norway. Nediyanan controlled most of the LTTE assets and front organizations until the LTTE’s military defeat. Later, he became the unofficial head of the International Secretariat of the LTTE. TEPA is the strongest Tamil organization of the diaspora, particularly in Scandinavia, parts of Europe, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Nediyanan’s faction is active all over the world and liaises with the Tamils and LTTE front organizations. TEPA also

⁸³ “About,” accessed January 11, 2016, <http://tamilsforum.co.uk/about>.

⁸⁴ “Evolution of Liberation Tigers” Ministry of Defense 2

⁸⁵ “About,” accessed January 11, 2016, <http://tamilsforum.co.uk/about/>.

plays an active role among Tamil Nadu politicians and is involved in political activities in India. Figure 6 shows the TEPA's organization.




Figure 6. The Organization of Tamil Elam People's Assembly⁸⁶

Nediyan, who is carrying out Prabhakaran's radical Tamil-homeland concept, opposes the TGTE's leader, Visvanathan Rudrakumaran. TEPA's website states, "Nediyan is opposed to Tamil National Alliance. He believes that the fight for separatism initiated by Prabhakaran should continue. [Nediyan is a] master in propaganda."⁸⁷ This statement portrays TEPA as a radical group that carries out LTTE ideology according to Thimpu principles as a continuation of Prabhakaran's aggressive ideologies; however, TEPA's covert network used for this purpose is currently unknown. Nediyan has shown through his aggressive stance that he is very eager to become the sole representative of the Tamil diaspora.

⁸⁶Source: Amarasinghe, "Modus Operandi."

⁸⁷ Maya Anthony, "The LTTE Nediyan Faction to Continue the Fight: Launches a New Tamil TV Channel 'Deepam,'" Tamil Elam People's Alliance (TEPA), December 27, 2015, <https://terroristfronts.wordpress.com/2015/12/27/the-ltte-nediyan-faction-to-continue-the-fight-launches-a-new-tamil-tv-channel-deepam-2/>.

TEPA's main concern is to continue acquiring funding from the Tamil diaspora community since the LTTE's defeat in 2009 in Sri Lanka. Nediyan was unwilling to acknowledge that the leader of LTTE, Prabahakaran, was killed by the Sri Lankan military during the final battle between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan military in May 2009. Nediyan is of the opinion that the declaration of Prabahakaran's death will badly affect his group's fundraising campaign, so he became a rival of the TGTE. Over this fundraising issue and the announcement of the formation of the TGTE by Kumararan Pathmanadan (KP), the chief procurer of arms for the LTTE organization, Nediyan carries out strategies to hinder the TGTE's functions and to reduce its strength. He continues to maintain a good relationship, however, with the GTF leader, Fr. Emmanuel. After the defeat of the LTTE, Nediyan made a serious attempt to rally supporters and LTTE sympathizers overseas to strengthen his faction's power and continue fundraising in support of his separatist goals.⁸⁸ Additionally, the GTF pretends to oppose TEPA's theories, but it seems that the GTF has preserved its separatist ideology and is willing to support other radical groups to achieve its primary objective.

Nediyan is responsible for launching the Tamil Television Network (TTN) a broadcast station that is viewable in Europe, Sri Lanka, and South India. Though the French government has banned the TTN, Nediyan has managed establish new channels, the GTV and Madhuram. The LTTE converted the Deepam television network into a fundraising project. Their main concern was to spread their aggressive propaganda throughout Europe, Sri Lanka, and India. Pro-LTTE diaspora and Nediyan have three reasons for installing these channels. The first is to work with the TNA for its goal—a Tamil homeland. Second, the Tamil Tigers are bent on pressuring the Sri Lankan government to take them off the blacklist. Third, this group is demanding a referendum on the North and East separation. The Canadian and Australian Tamil Congresses as well as the Global and British Tamil Forums support the LTTE propaganda, fundraising, and procurement affairs used to remove the groups from Sri Lanka's blacklist. So many

⁸⁸ Camelia Nathaniel, "The Nediyan's Faction," Tamil Elam People's Alliance (TEPA), April 27, 2104, <https://terroristfronts.wordpress.com/2014/04/27/the-nediyavans-faction-tamil-eelam-peoples-alliance-tepa/>.

international Tamil television networks have been initiated by Nediawanto to continue the aggressive propaganda in Europe and elsewhere.⁸⁹ It is obvious that this group also professes the ideology of a separate state for Tamils rather than the concept of calling themselves Sri Lankans.

TEPA leader Nediawan also coordinates with other extremist groups and provokes youths to carry out demonstrations against the Sinhalese population and the government of Sri Lanka. A few radical Tamils favor Nediawan, whom they believe is the present-day LTTE leader and successor of Prabhakaran. On March 9, 2015, the Tamil Coordinating Committee (TCC) and Tamil Youth Organization (TYO) planned for a mass protest against the visit of Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena outside the Marlborough House head office in the Commonwealth. During this visit, the British prime minister, Sri Lankan president, British monarch, and representatives of the Commonwealth countries were scheduled to attend an evening reception at Marlborough House.⁹⁰

TEPA has no faith in the government's truth-seeking and reform processes in Sri Lanka and the UNHCR. In 2015, at a demonstration organized by TEPA, protesters expressed their anger by burning photos of TNA leader Rajavaroatham Sampandan and parliamentarian Mathiapparan Abraham Sumanthiran, who had allegedly schemed with the Sinhala state to undermine the Tamil National cause. Protestors claimed that the Sinhala-Buddhist state had not taken meaningful steps toward justice and reform for lasting peace. This group has felt that human rights authorities have not taken action toward the violation of international law between 2002 and 2011, and they are not satisfied with the ongoing investigation. Protestors fear that if these investigations are held inland, victims would have to risk their lives to give evidence. Tamil protestors suspect the decision to delay the UNCHR's is meant to prevent punishment of those

⁸⁹ "Evolution of Liberation Tigers" Ministry of Defense

⁹⁰ "Eelam Tamils Set to Protest Sirisena Visit to UK," Tamil Coordinating Committee United Kingdom, March 8, 2015, <http://www.tccuk.org/?p=24>.

responsible for genocide. These protestors say that the United States, as the chief sponsor of the original resolution, has the responsibility to ensure appropriate follow-up action.⁹¹

On February 4, 2015, as a mark of disrespect, many Tamils gathered outside the PM's office in the UK to express their anger and dislike for Independence Day, which they listed as a black day. They claimed that the UK was responsible for capturing the Tamil homeland and handing it over to the Sinhala-Buddhists of Sri Lanka for occupation.⁹² It seems that Nediyanwan has made every possible attempt to undermine the ongoing peace process by claiming that the present government lacks the will and credibility to settle the ethnic problem. He has also rejected the alignment of the TNA with government proposals for building peace and stability among the communities in question. The TNA's primary concern is still to levy total punishment for the alleged genocide of Tamils.

E. LTTE HEADQUARTERS GROUP IN FRANCE

In early 2010, the LTTE Headquarters Group was established by former LTTE combatants and other criminal elements (see Figure 7). During the latter part of the war in 2009, Vinayagam, a former combatant and senior-intelligence cadre member of the LTTE, managed to escape and was appointed as head of this group. Vinayagam's group is engaged in human smuggling operations. These criminal elements do not appear in public as their movements have been minimized since Interpol has issued red notices against them for criminal offenses. A considerable number of ex-LTTE cadres who escaped during the humanitarian operations with pro-LTTE activists have still been operating in various guises in the United States, Canada, and Europe, where a significant Tamil diaspora exists.⁹³ Although the LTTE has been defeated and their top leadership eliminated, it seems the former international LTTE network remains active to achieve its separatist goals. The next section further elaborates on the activities of the Tamil diaspora in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada.

⁹¹ "Eelam Tamils Set to Protest," Tamil Coordinating Committee.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Amarasinghe, "Modus Operandi."



Figure 7. Organization of the LTTE Headquarters Group⁹⁴

F. THE TAMIL DIASPORA’S POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, UNITED STATES, AND CANADA

1. United Kingdom

The majority of the Tamil diaspora resides in the United Kingdom. A recent census reveals that approximately 300,000 Sri Lankan Tamils live there.⁹⁵ To a certain extent, the BTF, being the main Tamil diaspora organization in the UK, directs Europe and the North American efforts to achieve an independent state for the Tamils in Sri Lanka. Under the BTF, many Tamil sub-organizations are working with the main British political parties and their politicians to obtain support for their cause. A few of these organizations, the Tamils for Labor Party (TLP), the British Tamils Conservative Party

⁹⁴ Source: Amarasinghe, “Modus Operandi.”

⁹⁵ “David Cameron’s Decision on CHOGM Sets the Wrong Precedence – British Tamils Forum,” Colombo Telegraph, May 8, 2013, <https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/david-camersons-decision-on-chogm-sets-the-wrong-precedence-british-tamils-forum/>.

(BTC), and the British Tamils for Liberal Democratic (BTLD), support the British Labor Party, Conservative Party, and Liberal Democrats, respectively.⁹⁶

On September 24, 2008, a special session of the Labor Party, called “Britain in the World Debate,” was held by Foreign Secretary David Miliband to discuss the Sri Lankan Tamils’ right to self-determination in Sri Lanka. At the meeting, Miliband stressed that Britain had a moral duty as part of its foreign policy toward the internal crisis in other countries around the globe. The presence of British Secretary of State Douglas Alexander and Defense Secretary Des Browne was significant. The audience included the Honorable Peter Mandelson, senior Labor Party officials, other members of the British and European Parliaments, as well as business leaders. Mr. Kandiah, the master of ceremonies, urged the British Tamils to pass a resolution to create a condition for a separate state. In his speech, he also elaborated on the situation and declared, “The Tamil people’s right to self-determination is inevitable and essential.”⁹⁷

In February 2010, the 65,000 Sri Lankan Tamils residing in the UK cast their vote in favor of a separate state in Sri Lanka. The poll was organized by the Tamil National Council. Votes were cast in sixty-five booths in London’s major townships and cities. According to the final count, 64,256 voters (99.3 percent) backed the resolution while 185 (0.29 percent) opposed it.⁹⁸ 251 votes (0.3 percent) were rejected. This type of vote has also taken place in Norway, Netherland, France, Germany, and Switzerland. Suren Surendiran, the spokesperson for the BTF, confirmed the Tamils’ commitment to a separate state in Sri Lanka as the outcome of the polling, globally.⁹⁹

On February 24, 2010, the inaugural meeting of the Global Tamil Forum (GTF) was held in the UK, attended by British Foreign Secretary Miliband, Conservative Party Shadow Foreign Secretary William Hague, and Liberal Democratic Shadow Foreign Secretary Ed Davey. All dignitaries made a speech at the meeting. Representatives from

⁹⁶ “Evolution of Liberation Tigers,” Ministry of Defense.

⁹⁷ “Tamil Addresses British Labour Party Conference,” *Tamil Guardian*, September 24, 2008, <http://www.tamilguardian.com/article.asp?articleid=1933>.

⁹⁸ Sam Jones, “British-Based Tamils Vote for Independent State in Sri Lanka,” *The Guardian*, February 1, 2010, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/feb/01/british-tamil-state-sri-lanka>.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

fourteen countries were also present in the House of Commons. Speakers included politicians, councilors, prospective parliamentary candidates, and some delegates. Some of them were invited to private meetings with Prime Minister Gordon Brown. A Buddhist monk and an Islamic theologian traveled from Sri Lanka to take part in the event. The African parliamentarian of the National Congress, Sisa Njikelana, was flown to Britain for only six hours, the duration of the meeting. David Miliband highly applauded the GTF for bringing members from 14 countries¹⁰⁰ and commented, “It is a reflection of the breadth of the Tamil Diaspora around the world, and ... speaks to a unity that will serve the rights and hopes of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka.”¹⁰¹

On October 1, 2014, members of the Conservative Party expressed support for the Tamil community at a reception held in the UK. In Birmingham, a reception took place at the Castle Fine Art Gallery during which British Conservative Party and Parliament members announced their support for the Tamil community. The chairman of the Conservative Party, British government ministers, Parliament members, and other policymakers participated in the session organized by the British Tamil conservatives. Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Theresa Villiers, Secretary of State for Justice Chris Grayling, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister of State Hugo Swire, and Conservative Party Chairman Grant Shapps graced this function. At this meeting, Villiers stated the “‘Tamil community has many friends in parliament’ and the ‘concerns of British Tamils are heard loud and clear.’”¹⁰² She also expressed, “The British government will continue to press for justice for those thousands of Tamils who suffered, particularly in the final few months of the conflict.”¹⁰³ Member of Parliament Robert Halfon, addressing the attendees, stressed his fellow lawmakers to abide by his stance that “Tamils have been victims of genocide and deserve the right to have their own

¹⁰⁰ “GTF Launch Well Attended by British Politicians,” TamilNet, February 25, 2010, <http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=31263>.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² “Conservative Party Members of Parliament Voice Support for the Tamil Community,” Eye Sri Lanka, October 2, 2014, <http://www.eyesrilanka.com/2014/10/02/conservative-party-members-of-parliament-voice-support-for-the-tamil-community/>.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

nationhood.”¹⁰⁴ He also stated that he is eagerly awaiting to see the establishment of a Tamil homeland and the acknowledgment of Tamil rights, which fulfill the diaspora’s goals.

The BTF had criticized David Cameron’s pronouncement to join the 2013 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Sri Lanka. According to the BTF, Cameron’s decision had set a wrong precedent. A spokesman for the Queen had confirmed her inability to be present at this summit. This was the first time since 1973 that a meeting of this caliber was to be held without the presence of the Head of the Commonwealth. The Tamil protesters carried out demonstrations that highlighted, first, the failure of the Sri Lankan government to implement the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) adopted by the Human Rights Council in March 2012 and, second, the categorical rejection of the UNHRC resolution (22/L.1) adopted in March 2013. Furthermore, the BTF devoted its efforts to demanding that Sri Lanka be expelled from the Commonwealth and the 2013 CHOGM be shifted to the UK to make it convenient for the Queen to attend.¹⁰⁵

2. United States

The TGTE had established its headquarters in the United States in May 2010 with the intention of setting up a sovereign state of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka.¹⁰⁶ The headquarters is located at 875 Avenue of the Americas, Suite 100, New York, New York.¹⁰⁷ The TGTE had its first meeting from September 29 to October 1, 2010 at the United Nations Plaza Hotel in New York to frame its own constitution and elect a prime minister. The group observed a moment of silence to honor those who sacrificed their lives during the struggle for freedom. Among those who addressed the conference were former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark, Deputy Chief Minister of Penang

¹⁰⁴ “Conservative Party Members of Parliament Voice Support,” Eye Sri Lanka.

¹⁰⁵ “David Cameron’s Decision on CHOGM,” Colombo Telegraph.

¹⁰⁶ “Rudrakumaran ‘PM of Tamil Government,’” BBC, October 3, 2010, http://www.bbc.com/sinhala/news/story/2010/10/101003_tgte_government.shtml.

¹⁰⁷ “Contact Us,” Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam-USA, accessed February 5, 2016, <http://www.tgte-us.org/contact.html>.

(Malaysia), Palanisamy Ramasamy, David L. Philips from Columbia University, and Ali Beydoun, Executive Director of Human Rights Impact Litigation Clinic on Human Rights Impact at Washington College of Law. This establishment had recently issued a war-crimes report to the United Nations. The TGTE had facilitated its members in London and Paris to view the conference and communicate their ideas via teleconference.¹⁰⁸

In 2008, Tamils for Obama, a political action committee of American Tamils, announced a fundraising event and its support for Democratic candidate Senator Barack Obama during his election campaign. The purpose of supporting the presidential candidate was to get him involved with policy changes in connection with the genocidal war in Sri Lanka. The organizers thought that by donating financial aid through Tamils for Obama's website, politically motivated Americans would raise their voices and help the Tamils around the globe end the genocide of Tamils in Sri Lanka.¹⁰⁹

In January 2012, Tamils for Obama sent a letter to Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Robert Blake, recognizing his role and asking him to investigate allegations of human right abuses in Sri Lanka. He was also asked to reject the LLRC's final report as partial and insufficient. The group also requested that Secretary Blake initiate an international investigation over the war crimes committed during the last humanitarian operations in Sri Lanka.¹¹⁰

On February 29, 2012, Tamils for Obama met U.S. government officials over the problems concerning Tamils in Sri Lanka. This meeting was held with the participation of Robert Blake, other State Department officials, and the assistant secretary, who were asked to push the matter of a self-government referendum for North and East Sri Lanka.

¹⁰⁸“Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam Becomes Official,” Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam-USA, October 2, 2010, http://www.tamilnet.com/img/publish/2010/10/TGTE_2nd_Sitting_press_release_02.10.2010_en.pdf.

¹⁰⁹ “‘Tamils for Obama’ Is Asking Our Fellow Americans to Support the Obama Campaign with Donations, and Offers a Way to Get the Money to the Obama Campaign,” PRWeb, October 20, 2008, <http://www.prweb.com/releases/2008/10/prweb1472214.htm>.

¹¹⁰ “‘Tamils for Obama Asks Secretary Blake to Reject LLRC Report and Call for International Investigation of Sri Lanka’s Civil War,’” PRWeb, January 5, 2012, <http://www.prweb.com/releases/2012/1/prweb9077032.htm>.

A letter was prepared by Tamils for Sri Lanka to be handed over to Blake with a copy to Secretary of State Clinton.¹¹¹

On October 10, 2012, Assistant Secretary Robert Blake had a meeting with the Tamil diaspora regarding his September 12–14 visit to Sri Lanka. These discussions were aimed at Tamil communities' concerns and brought forward a suggestion to organize a U.S. business delegation to be sent to Northern Sri Lanka. U.S. officials wanted to investigate and explore avenues of trade and investment opportunities in cooperation with the Sri Lankan government. A second goal was the creation of a sustainable livelihood for the Tamil inhabitants of Northern Sri Lanka.¹¹²

In May 2013, the TGTE released the Tamil Eelam Freedom Charter. This charter was drafted with the help of Tamil groups and individuals all over the world. Famous freedom fighter Dr. Nuran Nabi, Mukti Bahini of Bangladesh, former Attorney General of the United States Ramsey Clark, and Hon. Daniel Mayan from the Sudan People's Liberation Movement were some of the intellectuals involved in forming this charter. These individuals emphasized the historical importance of this freedom charter and pledged their support.¹¹³ The TGTE marked May 18, 2015, the Tamil nation's Day of Mourning. The TGTE announced the Mullivaikal Memorial Lecture Series, and former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark was to deliver the inaugural lecture in New York by invitation of the TGTE prime minister.¹¹⁴

In July 2013, Tamils for Obama addressed a letter to members of both houses of Congress, requesting that they back a referendum on independence to North and East Sri

¹¹¹ "Tamils for Obama Meets with Assistant Secretary Blake, Asks Blake, Clinton to Push Self-Government Referendum in Northeastern Sri Lanka," PRWeb, March 27, 2012, <http://www.prweb.com/releases/2012/3/prweb9326814.htm>.

¹¹² "Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Robert O. Blake Jr. Meeting with Tamil diaspora," U. S. Department of State, October 12, 2012, <http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/press/2012/199062.htm.diaspora>

¹¹³ "Tamil Eelam Freedom Charter Declared," Scoop World, May 28, 2013, <http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO1305/S00671/tamil-eelam-freedom-charter-declared.htm>.

¹¹⁴ "Sri Lanka: Former US Attorney General Ramsey Clark to deliver Mullivaikal Memorial Lecture in New York," Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam, May 16, 2015, <http://www.tgte-homeland.org/sri-lanka-former-us-attorney-general-ramsey-clark-to-deliver-mullivaikal-memorial-lecture-in-new-york-may-18-tgte/>.

Lanka. They wrote to the president, citing a number of incidents during which Sri Lanka had committed genocide against the Tamils. The Tamil diaspora also urged President Obama to pass a resolution to push the referendum. In the letter, Tamils for Obama highlighted the example of South Sudan and its successful referendum for independence. The Tamils also requested an appointment to discuss their aspirations in Sri Lanka.¹¹⁵

On July 30, 2014, the United States Political Action Committee (USTPAC) urged the international community to act in response to the July 1983 anti-Tamil violence in Sri Lanka and the subsequent denial of justice for victims. The day has been marked as an anniversary. USTPAC arranged religious observances with the Tamils scattered worldwide to commemorate this date and criticized the behavior of the Buddhist monks who led the violence against Tamils with the sanctions and support of the Sri Lankan government.¹¹⁶

On October 1, 2013, the TGTE held its annual meeting under the patronage of its Prime Minister Vishwanadan Rudrakumaran. At the session, Rudrakumaran dissolved the parliament and held a new election to select his parliament members. On December 6 and 8, 2013, during the second parliamentary term, 112 newly elected members took oaths in New Jersey, United States. Some of the other members had joined via video conference from Zurich, Switzerland. This session was telecast live on www.tgte-us.org and www.naathamnews.com.¹¹⁷

3. Canada

Even after the end of the struggle in 2009, many Tamil organizations in Canada struggled to establish a separate state called “Tamil Eelam.” Toronto has the most densely populated Tamil area in Canada. There are approximately 200,000 Sri Lankan

¹¹⁵ “Tamils to Obama: Meet with us to discuss future of Tamils in Sri Lanka,” PRWeb, January 30, 2013, <http://www.prweb.com/releases/2013/1/prweb10371655.htm>

¹¹⁶ “Black July in Sri Lanka-Yesterday and Today,” United States Tamils Political Action Council, July 30, 2014, <https://ustpac.org/black-july-in-sri-lanka-yesterday-and-today/>.

¹¹⁷ Suthan Raj, “Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE) Begins Its 2nd Parliamentary Term. Inaugural Session on December 6th,” *EIN News*, December 4, 2013, <http://www.einpresswire.com/article/179389897/transnational-government-of-tamil-eelam-tgte-begins-its-2nd-parliamentary-term-inaugural-session-on-december-6th>.

Tamils residing in Toronto out of a total population of 300,000 Sri Lankan Tamils in Canada.¹¹⁸ Canadian law enforcement agencies and secret services are on the alert regarding the infiltration of the LTTE into their political institutions. Some Sri Lankan Tamils have even crept into the political parties of Canada, mainly the new Democratic Party as well as Liberal and Conservative parties.¹¹⁹

On December 20, 2009, 99.8 percent of a 48,583-strong voting bloc managed to mandate the separate state concept in an election held at 31 centers in Canada.¹²⁰ The Canadian Tamil media units and their politicians were satisfied with the turnout, which was as they expected. One of the organizers said that the referendum is a favorable precedent for a transnational government. The Canadian Tamil media also commented positively.¹²¹

Rathika Sitsabaiesan, the first Sri Lankan Tamil candidate, secured a parliamentary seat in the 2011 Canadian election. Canadian authorities have observed that Rathika's interest in parliament is to promote LTTE interests along with other nominees in Canada and overseas. Her strategy is to racialize and radicalize the Tamils.¹²² After entering parliament, she stated, "I've been a Tamil all my life and those negative stigmas on the community ... we have the opportunity now to break through. ... [W]e as a community cannot be thrown under that blanket statement. This is just another step in the development of the Canadian Tamil community."¹²³

In September 2011, Rathika Sitsabaiesan held a well-attended viewing of Channel 4 Documentaries' coverage of war crimes in Sri Lanka, which was screened at Parliament

¹¹⁸ Kathy English, "The Truth about Tamil Statistics," *Toronto Star*, January 8, 2015, http://www.thestar.com/opinion/columnists/2009/04/04/the_truth_about_tamil_statistics.html.

¹¹⁹ Camelia Nathaniel, "Canada's Emerging Politics of Terror," Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sri Lanka, June 29, 2014, <http://www.mea.gov.lk/index.php/news-from-other-media/4865-canadas-emerging-politics-of-terror>.

¹²⁰ "99.8 percent say yes to Tamil Eelam in Canada referendum," Tamil Net, December 20, 2009, <http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=79&artid=30845>.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ "Canada's First Tamil MP Looks Forward to Challenge," CBC News, May 3, 2011, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/canada-s-first-tamil-mp-looks-forward-to-challenge-1.1061403>.

Hill, Ottawa. The Parliament Minister Patrick Brown of the Conservative Party, representative of Barrie, and the Parliament Minister John McKay of the Liberal Party, representative of Scarborough-Guildwood, were at the event. Minister of Parliament Rathika Sitsabaiesan addressed the crowd about war crimes at the final battle and the responsibility of the Sri Lankan government: “I am very pleased that all parties came together to host this event. This issue runs deeper than political ties, and it is very important we all work together to raise awareness of this issue and to engage in an open dialogue concerning the atrocities that took place in Sri Lanka.”¹²⁴ Liberal Party Parliament Minister John McKay also stressed that Canada should ensure accountability. In addition, Parliament Minister John McKay urged Canada to ensure accountability, saying, “Canada is a nation that values human rights and Canada bears the responsibility to the 300,000 Tamil Canadians here.”¹²⁵

To coincide with these events, the LTTE front organizations in Canada appeared to extend their cooperation to Rathika’s nomination and election to the Canadian Parliament. These groups were as follows: the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE), the National Council of Canadian Tamils (NCCT), the Canadian Tamil Congress (CTC), and the Tamil Youth Organization (TYO). United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1373 has categorized these groups as terrorist organizations. Subsequently, Rathika has urged national spokesman David Poopalapillai and Danton Thurairajah of the CTC to penetrate the Canadian political system. Therefore, Camelia Nathaniel argues that radical parliamentarian Rathika Sitsabaiesan was responsible for opening the doors of the Canadian government to key members of the terrorist fronts to occupy appointments in the political parties.¹²⁶

On June 12, 2014, the CTC managed to nominate another three candidates for the provincial election in Ontario. The party ticket was offered to Neethan Shan, Ken Kirupa, and Shan Thayaparan, for Scarborough-Rouge-River, Scarborough-Guild Wood, and

¹²⁴ Tamil Guardian, “Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields’ Screened to Canadian MPs,” accessed February 3, 2016. <http://www.tamilguardian.com/article.asp?articleid=3568>.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Nathaniel, “Canada’s Emerging Politics of Terror.”

Markham-Unionville, respectively. Camelia Nathaniel has claimed that unless the Canadian parties and Canadians themselves take precautions to check the background of their applicants, nominees supported by terrorist fronts will have the capability to enter the parliamentary system and uphold extremism.¹²⁷

Then-Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper refused to attend the Commonwealth summit meeting in Sri Lanka. He threatened that Canada would suspend funding for the 64-year-old Commonwealth organization on the basis of human rights abuses by the Sri Lankan government. Hence, Harper did not attend the Colombo conference and refrained from sending a cabinet level representative.¹²⁸ A *News East West* article reported, “Canadian Tamil Congress national spokesman [David Poopalapillai] said, ‘On behalf of all Tamil Canadians, we thank our Prime Minister for his principled stand.’ Appealing to other Commonwealth nations to follow Canada in boycotting the summit, Poopalapillai said, ‘with CHOGM just a few weeks away, we once again urge Commonwealth members to stand in solidarity with Canada.’”¹²⁹

Though there is a doubt over the connection between the Tamil diaspora’s political efforts and the re-emergence of an armed conflict in Sri Lanka, the following section provides evidence in three examples.

G. THE POSSIBLE RE-EMERGENCE OF TERRORISM

The ex-LTTE cadres who have not gone through the rehabilitation process may remain tied to Prabhakaran’s ideology. A few LTTE cadres who had escaped during humanitarian operations are suspected to be among the Tamil diaspora’s radical groups, those who were not rehabilitated. Records indicate that there are approximately 2,000 LTTE cadre members remaining, comprising those who evaded arrest and were outside

¹²⁷ Nathaniel, “Canada’s Emerging Politics of Terror.”

¹²⁸ “Harper Plans to Boycott Commonwealth Summit in Sri Lanka,” Canadian Press, October 7, 2013, <http://o.canada.com/news/harper-plans-to-boycott-commonwealth-summit-in-sri-lanka>.

¹²⁹ “Canadian Tamil Congress Hails Harper for CHOGM 2013 Boycott, Urges Other Nations to Follow Suit,” *News East West*, October 7, 2013, <http://newseastwest.com/canadian-tamil-congress-hails-harper-for-chogm-boycott-urges-other-nations-to-follow-suit/>.

the country without being rehabilitated. These cadres are liable to regroup and re-engage in an armed conflict against the state. The Sri Lankan military is on the alert to recover missing LTTE materiel such as ammunition, explosives, and other combat equipment. A danger exists wherein the remaining and overlooked LTTE cadre members have access to hazardous material to carry out violent, extremist acts.¹³⁰ The following outlines three such attempts to counter or pre-empt potential LTTE attacks by the Sri Lankan military.

1. Attempt 1: March 2012

On March 17, 2012, a person named Muttu, belonging to the Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP), was killed by the LTTE on the instruction of Kamalanathan Sadeeshkumar (alias Kumaran) who was stationed in France under the leadership of Vinayagam. On the arrest of a few suspects by the army, it was revealed that Kumaran had moved to India in November 2011. There in India, he organized a group of fifteen ex-LTTE cadre members to carry out strikes in Sri Lanka. However, he split these members into three groups and sent one team to Sri Lanka on March 6, 2012 to carry out assassinations in the Trincomalee district. All cadre members who came to Sri Lanka and were involved in the killing of Muttu were arrested, thus exposing the initial attempt made by the LTTE to recommence terrorist activities after the civil war.¹³¹ Today, this problem seems mostly international, and the chances of reconciliation within Sri Lanka are very remote due to the actions of overseas, LTTE-linked groups. These groups are in favor of separatism and on the verge of culminating armed struggles to facilitate LTTE objectives in Sri Lanka.

2. Attempt 2: December 2012

With the arrest of an ex-LTTE cadre in December 2012, security forces were able to illuminate an organized LTTE network functioning in India (Chennai). Further investigation revealed that pro-LTTE elements funded this group. Initially, six people, including rehabilitated female ex-LTTE, were arrested in Jaffna, and their arrests led to

¹³⁰ Amarasinghe, "Modus Operandi."

¹³¹ Ibid.

the apprehension of four more in connection with the LTTE. In this arrest, three were identified as former LTTE combatants, with one person identified as an electronic expert. During the raid in Chennai, police were able to recover laptops, electronic circuits, cables and a few documents related to planned operations. A significant feature of the event was that these youth were carrying LTTE ideology with them. The interrogation of the arrested extremists revealed that the LTTE was recruiting youth with information-technology knowledge as well as fishing experience in deep sea waters, aimed at conducting future operations in Sri Lanka. The arrest of the six youths involved in this network from Jaffna (in Sri Lanka), the raid on an LTTE safe house in Chennai (in South India), and the arrest of four more LTTE operatives in Tamil Nadu (also in South India) resulted in the dismantling of this LTTE cell.¹³² These incidents indicate that Tamil Nadu is being used as an LTTE reorganizing location. Former LTTE cadres are making attempts to coordinate and regroup with local elements for acts of sabotage to disrupt the peace process.

3. Attempt 3: March 2014

In March 2014, two suspects were arrested in Jaffna with handbills against national unity. This arrest revealed a covert LTTE operative network with the financial support of a foreign LTTE network in Europe. Some eighty-three suspects detained in the North consisted of both rehabilitated and non-rehabilitated LTTE members who had been found guilty of criminal offenses. Three non-rehabilitated senior LTTE members, Sundaralingam Kajeepan (alias Thevihan), Selvanayagam Kajeepan (alias Gobi), and Navaratnam Navaneethan (alias Appan), were later killed by security forces during a confrontation on April 11, 2014 when attempts were made to apprehend them. Investigations revealed that the three LTTE senior members, who were based in Switzerland, the UK, and India, had links to Nediyan, Vinayagam, and the LTTE Headquarters Group. Out of the 83 suspects arrested, forty-seven are still detained for further investigation over their involvement in this latest revamping attempt. The military and police seized a small amount of weapons, ammunition, claymores (anti-personnel

¹³² Amarasinghe, "Modus Operandi."

mines), and three mine detectors used to identify the location of buried caches of military hardware. Notable throughout the operations was the cooperation of the public and the wealth of information the government received from the local community that enabled the identification of key LTTE suspects and their collaborators, which subsequently resulted in the death of all three key LTTE leaders in Wanni, Sri Lanka, on April 11, 2014.¹³³

Although the military movement of the separatist insurgency, the LTTE, was defeated in 2009, the three aforementioned incidents as well as the continued attempts of the Tamil diaspora strongly hint that the Tamil separatist ideology still exists. The Tamil homeland issue is much stronger among LTTE members living abroad who are rich and educated than those members who live in the suburbs with lesser privileges. Thus, global Tamil cadres are more interested in the creation of an independent sovereign state in Sri Lanka using local Tamil politics as an instrument.

H. THE TAMIL NATIONAL ALLIANCE

The TNA is the leading political entity, an opposition party that represents the Tamil community in North and East Sri Lanka. The Tamil people are spread across the island, but the majority of them have historically lived in the North and East. The main complaint forwarded to the government through the TNA concerns the question of specific constitutional provisions to be adopted for the Tamil-speaking people in those areas. Power sharing in governance is one of the TNA's concepts. This concept, according to the TNA, is not just power-sharing but sharing with special features crucial for the independence of the Tamil people who inhabit the island as opposed to the other provinces in Sri Lanka. The TNA considers of paramount importance a resolution to the national question of sharing the powers of governance through shared sovereignty between the Tamils and Sinhalese inhabiting Sri Lanka. Some of those salient features in

¹³³ D.B.S. Jeyaraj, "Death in the Jungle: Quixotic Saga of Theiveegan, Appan and Gobi," April 19, 2014, <https://tamiltigeractivities.wordpress.com/2014/04/19/death-in-the-jungle-quixotic-saga-of-theiveegan-appan-and-gobi/>.

achieving genuine reconciliation and lasting peace, according to TNA,¹³⁴ and principles are described as follows:

- The Tamils inhabiting this island from times immemorial along with the Sinhalese people have their distinct culture civilization, language of their own heritage;
- Northern and Eastern provinces are their historical inhabitation grounds with contiguous preponderantly Tamil speaking people; it is claimed;
- It is claimed that the self-determination of rights political, economical, social and cultural are being enjoyed according to the United Nations International Covenants;
- They propose that devolution of power based on federal structure to north and east;
- Land ownership and police powers;
- Direct foreign investment in the North-East should be allowed to create job opportunities.;
- Avenues to be open for those who are unable to enter universities to pursue higher studies in their relevant fields to be established;
- All that has been stated above shall be legislated and executed within the framework of a united Sri Lanka;
- The Tamil-speaking Muslim people inhabiting the North and East would also abide by the and would be entitled as beneficiaries of power sharing arrangement;
- It is proposed that comprehensive programs for development of the North and East in every field with the support of the government, Tamil Diaspora and the International community. This phenomenon was not at all possible to be implemented during the term of the former regime since the country did not have a strong and stable government. When a new government is established TNA is actually responsible to promote this issue and also to include development of Palaly as an International Airport and development of harbors in the North and East;

¹³⁴ “People’s Mandate Projected Differently by TNA MPs,” accessed January 11, 2016, <http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=79&artid=36739>Tamil Net; “TNA Releases Election Manifesto,” accessed January 5, 2016. http://tnapolitics.org/?page_id=33.

- The action is to be taken by TNA to renovate small tanks in the North and East to cater to the needs of agriculture and drinking water for its inhabitants.¹³⁵

The pro-LTTE local Tamil political parties that are functioning in the country still espouse the separatist ideology among the Tamil population in the North and East. In their efforts to achieve separatism, these pro-LTTE political elements inculcate hatred and subvert the Tamil public against the government and the Sinhalese community. These radical Tamil political parties carry out activities locally and internationally, aimed at internationalizing local issues to obtain their demands through international pressure. The establishment of a number of organizations sympathetic to the separatist cause also has been observed since the military's defeat of the LTTE.¹³⁶ Their aim is to rally around Tamil intellectuals, political party members, and other influential elements in the Tamil community, to include media elements, to achieve the separatist objective. To this end, statements made by certain Tamil political leaders clearly indicate their continuing support for a separate state of Eelam, echoing Velupillai Prabhakaran's Mahaveer Day speeches calling for the establishment of Tamil Eelam. The October 13 speech of the TNA's parliamentarian Sritharan in Kilinochchi also called for a separate state in Sri Lanka. Certain extremist Tamil voices are clearly in line with the LTTE.¹³⁷ Local Tamil political parties have their strongest domination in the North and East than in the other provinces. Considering the ability of these parties to make their voices heard in the legislature and other policy circles, they can be regarded as an important contributor toward separatist ideology.

The TNA tries to achieve its demands indirectly based on the Prabahakaran's ideology. Some of the salient features of power-sharing supposedly describe merging the North and East. This way, opportunities may be created for the inhabitants for their future development with ample resources needed for education, health, law and order,

¹³⁵ "Our Stand on the Political Solution."

¹³⁶ "TNA Manifesto Contains Prabhakaran's Policies," *Sunday Observer*, accessed January 11, 2016, <http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2013/09/08/pol03.asp>.

¹³⁷ "People's Mandate Projected Differently by TNA MPs," accessed January 11, 2016, <http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=79&artid=36739> Tamil Net; "TNA Releases Election Manifesto," accessed January 5, 2016, http://tnapolitics.org/?page_id=33.

employment, and other avenues for tertiary education for those left out of school and unable to pursue higher studies. The Tamil people have the right to self-determination, according to the TNA.¹³⁸ The statement by the Sri Lankan foreign minister in addressing the 30th session of the UNHCR addresses the relevant issues and elaborates on the government's stance.¹³⁹

I. THE SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT'S STANCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND TAMIL ETHNIC PROBLEMS

President M. Sirisena of the newly elected government of Sri Lanka clearly expresses his determination to find a lasting solution to the ethnic problem in his official manifesto. President Sirisena explains that he will take reasonable and accountable steps to solve problems that arise and address post-war commitments. He emphasizes that he is fully aware of the prevailing social, political, and economic crises unaddressed so far. According to President Sirisena, the crisis has been regressing toward an unsolvable state despite the military's defeat of the LTTE. His genuine opinion in this direction is that the country cannot march forward without addressing these critical issues.¹⁴⁰

The president has taken many policy decisions to eliminate the cultural differences between Tamils and Sinhalese and strengthen Sri Lanka's judicial system. In this context, the president has emphasized that he has taken rightful action to establish all necessary commissions related to the functioning of various government services, including the Attorney General's department, and has deviated from the influence of politics. At present, these institutions have already been established and are functioning progressively. The other important factor that he mentions in his manifesto was granting freedom and reconciliation for cultural and religious institutions and consolidating the right of all communities to develop and secure their culture, language, and religion while recognizing the national Sri Lankan identity. President Sirisena points to the South African model as an example of reconciliation and peace building. Independence of the

¹³⁸ "TNA Manifesto Contains Prabhakaran's Policies," *Sunday Observer*.

¹³⁹ "Statement by Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera," Embassy of Sri Lanka.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

judiciary has been regularized by appointing the Judicial Service Commission. One important feature is that the appointment of judges and their promotion will be based on seniority and merit.¹⁴¹ Putting words into action, President Sirisena has appointed Kanagasabapathy Sripavan, a Tamil, as the Chief Justice of Sri Lanka and Rajavaritham Sampanthan, also a Tamil, as the opposition leader of the present government. In addressing the crucial issue of human rights violations and the allegations leveled against the Sri Lankan government, the President has clearly said that he will take action to uphold a humanitarian, environment-friendly approach both locally and internationally.¹⁴² Implementation of the reformed agenda enables Sri Lanka to achieve a meaningful reconciliation and good governance, which are some of the main considerations in the president's manifesto. In this direction, the appointments of Rajavaritham Sampanthan and Kanagasabapathy Sripavan, both Tamils, sends a clear message to the world that the present government rejects the petty considerations of ethnicity, religion, or any other evaluation that would deny citizens their genuine rights in society.

In Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera's speech addressing the Human Rights Council, he emphasizes that with his victory in general elections, the president and the prime minister had decided to form a joint government as intended before the elections. The main two components of this government have been arch rivals for decades in the political arena. However, they have now joined in consensual politics to create much-needed stability in the country. This action also helps to secure a political settlement of the ethnic conflict.¹⁴³

The newly formed government of Sri Lanka has taken corrective steps to address the complaints of the Tamil people, particularly in the areas of justice, to fulfill their aspirations. Reconciliation is the main theme of a political settlement in the agenda. The rule of law that had been eroded during the past decades has been restored, credibly

¹⁴¹ "Statement by Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera," Embassy of Sri Lanka.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Sri Lanka Guardian, "Manifesto: A Compassionate Maithri Governance, a Stable Country," Scribd, accessed January 7, 2016, <https://www.scribd.com/doc/250537023/Maithripala-Sirisena-Election-2015-Manifesto-English>.

empowering the mechanism of justice within the framework of the constitution.¹⁴⁴ The establishing statute of the two mechanisms is as follows:

- To establish a commission in consultation with the relevant authorities in South Africa for the reconciliation consist with religious dignitaries of all religions and the other is commissioner empowered. This would enable any perpetrators of human right abuses for whichever community to be brought to book and necessary action taken in the sense of justice and discover the truth.
- An office is to be set up on missing persons to enable the relevant families to acquire the “right to know” principle according to the ICRC ordinance acceptable to international standards.
- Right to justice problem is a judicial mechanism to be set up with the involvement of a special counsel taking to account the right of victims of whichever community they belong in general to be applied as a measure of remedy for that relevant type of offenses committed. This is mainly to show the society that the rule of law should be upheld at any rate.
- This is a similar office regarding the right of victims on the right to reparations to be set up to go into allegations of all types of the implementation of the recommendations regarding truth, justice, reconciliation and non-recurrence as guided by the LLRC report on such issues.¹⁴⁵

The new government is considering drafting a fresh constitution to address the possibility of a reemergence of ethnic conflict in the future. The Paris model of human rights has been seen as an obvious solution in strengthening human rights considerations. Thereby, the previously released presidential commission reports should be forwarded for necessary action. Any other internationally gazetted security ordinance valid for the prevention of terrorism may be adopted and could call upon Sri Lankans living abroad to come forward to assist the government in its peace-building and reconciliation efforts.¹⁴⁶

The mandate given to the present government by the people of the nation on January 8, 2015 and repeated on August 17, 2015 clearly updates the issues for the Sinhalese and Tamil extremists who have failed to secure seats in parliament. This

¹⁴⁴ Sri Lanka Guardian, “Manifesto: A Compassionate Maithri Governance.”

¹⁴⁵ “Statement by Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera,” Embassy of Sri Lanka.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

journey may not be as fast as some may wish. The present mandate given to the president and the prime minister is quite sufficient to enable them to go ahead in finding a lasting solution for the prevailing issues in Sri Lanka.¹⁴⁷

J. CONCLUSION

Though the roles, tasks, and policies of the TGTE, the GTF, the BTF, and TEPA have different wording, in their deliberations, they are each working toward the common goal of a separate state for Tamils in Sri Lanka. Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, and many countries in Europe have large migrant Tamil populations, which form notable voting blocs within the electoral constituencies in those countries. Although radicalized elements within the overall Tamil population are minimal, they are very active politically and capitalize on the presence of the larger Tamil diaspora to influence electoral politics to further their separatist goals. The GTF took a leading role in bringing other groups together under a common banner to create a conducive environment internationally to pursue the separatists. In the meantime, radicalized groups such as TEPA and the LTTE Headquarters Group have been actively engaged in reorganizing themselves for the next step in recapturing the North and East of Sri Lanka through a fresh struggle. The Tamil separatist insurgency, after the military defeat of the LTTE, has now morphed into a strategic diplomatic organization, whereby it seeks to gain legitimacy through international consensus and pressure on the Sri Lankan state. Although not physically present as militant groups within the territory of Sri Lanka, the insurgency still exists, albeit in ideological and diplomatic forms. Under favorable conditions, it has the possibility of adopting armed means as the major strategy again.


It seems that the issue of a separate state of the Tamil-speaking people of Sri Lanka is the most crucial issue in the Sri Lankan government's and Tamil diaspora's agendas. The demand for a Tamil homeland has been described in different ways by different ideologists. The Tamil diaspora's ideology is aligned with the LTTE proclamation; the only deviation is that the Tamil diaspora uses diplomacy and political approaches to oppose the LTTE's military efforts. Therefore, analyzing the Tamil

¹⁴⁷ "Statement by Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera," Embassy of Sri Lanka.

diaspora's political and social activities in the West and Europe, including within the local Tamil political parties, is critical to formulating a permanent solution to the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka. The end state of this effort is to achieve co-existence among all ethnic groups in Sri Lanka that appreciates the value of humanity to the highest degree.

III. ANALYSIS OF THE TAMIL DIASPORA'S POLITICAL SOCIAL ACTIVITIES, THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE TAMIL NATIONAL ALLIANCE

This chapter analyzes the political and social activities of the Tamil diaspora's prevailing pro-LTTE organizations (the TGTE, TEPA/TNC, the GTF, the BTF, and the LTTE Headquarters Group in the United States, Canada, and the UK. To achieve sustainable peace and stability in Sri Lanka, strategists for peace should foresee the requirements for the settlement of the ethnic problem. Therefore, in formulating these strategies, the author compares and contrasts conflicting interests of the Tamil diaspora and the Sri Lankan government along with the TNA. Then, the author identifies the Sri Lankan government's strengths and weaknesses in countering potential threats to sovereignty and territorial integrity and in exploiting opportunities to ensure political stability. The author's conceptual model for analysis is shown in Figure 8.



Adapted from Louis Kriesberg adopting conflict strategies¹⁴⁸ and SWOT¹⁴⁹ analysis.

Figure 8. Conceptual Model for Analysis

¹⁴⁸ Louis Kriesberg, "Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution," 138.

¹⁴⁹ Jacobsen, Eggen, and Kauchak, *Methods for Teaching*.

A. ANALYSIS: INTERESTS OF THE TAMIL DIASPORA AND THE SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT

1. Complementary Interests

Tamil diaspora communities were initially supportive of the reconciliation and reintegration of their ethnic community into the country's mainstream and of the Sri Lankan government's effort to implement recommendations made by the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC). The commission was an independent executive arm established to review conflict; find a meaningful, reasonable, and lasting solution to the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka; and promote peace building. Accordingly, since 2009, the Sri Lankan government has made tremendous post-conflict improvements in many aspects, including human rights issues. In this context, the government has been able to resettle 283,000 displaced civilians and to successfully rehabilitate and reintegrate 11,500 out of the 12,000 LTTE cadre members back into society. Furthermore, the government has allocated 253 billion Sri Lankan rupees (LKR) to the Northern Province¹⁵⁰ and 6.1 billion LKR to the Eastern Province¹⁵¹ for infrastructure development projects.

While both the government and Tamil diaspora agree to the reconciliation and reintegration process, a gray area exists. Protesters among the Tamil diaspora have carried out demonstrations specifically highlighting the failure of the Sri Lankan administration to implement the LLRC report and the absence of punitive action for alleged war crimes.¹⁵² In this context, in a CNN interview, former Sri Lankan High Commissioner to the UK Chris Nonis said that only a small group in the Tamil diaspora community has leveled criticism against Sri Lanka. He further stated that these types of conflicts are very common to many nations, and the resolutions are either speedy or prolonged. He stressed the matter of the Truth Reconciliation Commissions (TRC)'s findings and implementation in South Africa. Similar to the TRC, the LLRC report was published as a matter of justifying the implementation of restorative justice but not

¹⁵⁰ "Sri Lanka to Spend 253 Billion Rupees for Development of Northern Province," Colombo Page, May 20, 2011, http://www.colombopage.com/archive_11/May20_1305914434CH.php.

¹⁵¹ "Defence Spokesperson Refutes Adverse Propaganda: Batticaloa Geared for Polls," accessed March 1, 2016, http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20080228_01.

¹⁵² Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam, "'Trees for Justice' Campaign."

punitive action. Except for small misunderstandings on certain issues, the possibility has existed to sort out matters amicably through dialogue. Nonis contended the issue has been internationalized due to the thoughtless and shortsighted actions of a few individuals of the TNA and diaspora groups, who have turned the situation into a money-making machine. Since the majority of the wealthy, well-established Tamil diaspora lives in the United States, Canada, and the UK, some political leaders of those countries have supported them in initiating a new, more favorable inquiry.¹⁵³

Successive governments failed to build upon previous successes in the reconciliation and reintegration process. Former President Mahinda Rajapaksha's government failed to work continuously on the effective implementation of the LLRC recommendations.¹⁵⁴ These lapses on the part of the administration (2009–2015) created a vacuum in which the Tamil diaspora drew a mandate and blacklisted the government internationally. The present Sri Lankan government also failed to find a lasting solution to the ethnic problem.¹⁵⁵ The current administration initiated actions to work with the international community, especially with the United States. The government agreed to appoint a new committee to find human rights violations during the war in accordance with a human rights commission and the UN.¹⁵⁶ However, the present government has not shown improvements in implementing the commission's recommendations. In other words, the inter-coordination between the ethnic group's demands (involved in the conflict) and the government's efforts seem to be in slow motion.

The major requirement of the Tamil people in the North and East is to raise living standards and to ensure their wellbeing, which has been neglected for many decades due to the conflict. The Tamil diaspora completely failed to assist poor Tamils in this regard but fostered an extremist mentality among Sri Lankan expatriates. The key figures in the diaspora's organizations, mainly Rudrakumaran, Emmanuel, and Nediyan, also

¹⁵³ "Sri Lankan High Commissioner to the UK Dr. Chris Nonis CNN Interview about Sri Lanka War Crimes," YouTube video, 7:00, from a CNN interview of Dr. Chris Nonis, posted by "Chamara Kodithuwakku," November 16, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Iw_Ui-1QI8U.

¹⁵⁴ Sri Lanka Guardian, "Manifesto: A Compassionate Maithri Governance."

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ "Statement by Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera," Embassy of Sri Lanka.

adopted a new political strategy, which aligned with the LTTE agenda and misled local Tamil politicians and Tamil youth in Sri Lanka. The diaspora is still financially strong enough to play a leading role in assisting reconciliation and rehabilitation without misleading the moderate expatriates. A good example is the conversion of former LTTE arms procurement chief Kumaran Pathmanathan (KP), who is presently performing the remarkable task of caring for Tamil orphans.¹⁵⁷ Thus, the post-conflict era is the best period for rebuilding the Tamils' lives in a peaceful environment. The Sri Lankan official authorities failed to work together with the diaspora elite and Tamil community leaders to get them involved with community development efforts in the war-torn areas. If the government had developed these positive relationships, it could have paid dividends.

2. Conflicting Interests

a. Interest in a Separate Tamil State in Sri Lanka

Based on the Vaddukoddai Resolution and Thimpu principles, the Tamil diaspora is focused on regaining its sovereignty and right to self-determination in Sri Lanka.¹⁵⁸ The Tamil diaspora is actively involved in achieving its goal by funding, building international recognition, gaining international assistance, and conducting propaganda that acts as a counter to Sri Lanka's national interests and security concerns. The Tamil diaspora organizations are reportedly carrying out political meetings, demonstrations, and various campaigns in several countries, mainly in the West and Europe to highlight that Tamil survival and safety are at high risk.¹⁵⁹ Although the LTTE has been militarily defeated, the ideology of the Tamil homeland or a separate state in Sri Lanka remains unchanged among the Tamil diaspora. In the previous chapter, the author has substantial evidence including its behavior in various social and political activities. Among all

¹⁵⁷ Rohan Gunaratna, "LTTE Affiliates up to Same Old Tricks in Geneva - Prof. Dr. Rohan Gunaratna," *Daily News*, October 20, 2015, www.dailynews.lk/?q=features/ltte-affiliates-same-old-tricks-geneva-prof-dr-rohan-gunaratna.

¹⁵⁸ "Mission Statement," Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam-USA, accessed January 10, 2016, <http://www.tgte-us.org/mission.html>.

¹⁵⁹ Nadira Gunatilleke, "LTTE Lobby Swamps Geneva," *Daily News*, February 19, 2013, <http://archives.dailynews.lk/2013/02/19/news01.asp>.

organizations of the Tamil diaspora, the common goal is achieving a separate state for Tamils in Sri Lanka.

The Tamil diaspora projects its separate state ideology as a concept for justice and the protection of Tamil rights. The ideology of Eelam still exists in many ways under the guise of different themes whereby it influences the country's political mechanism. The Tamil diaspora created an unprecedented amount of international pressure based on purported war crimes. These actions use as an indirect political approach to achieve the primary goal of a Tamil homeland. One question remains as to why diaspora organizations are treating Velupillai Prabhakaran as a martyr. Arguably, this is the best platform to market the ideology of the homeland concept. The Tamil diaspora uses the fierce armed struggle as an interpretation of its right to freedom. Thus, the Tamil diaspora tries to gain global attention, recognition, and sympathy.

b. Discrediting the Sri Lankan Government and Its Security Forces for Alleged War Crimes

The Tamil diaspora groups—the TGTE, the GTF, and the BTF—are continuously pressuring Western and European countries to intervene in the humanitarian situation of Tamils in Sri Lanka. The Tamil diaspora created groups under various names, including the Tamils for Clinton, Tamils for Obama, and the Tamil Centre for Human Rights, to achieve their objectives. As a result of these groups' lobbying efforts, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) proposed appointing a committee to examine the alleged war crimes in Sri Lanka. The Tamil diaspora listed the UNHCR resolution as a task and has strongly pursued the implementation through the international community.¹⁶⁰ Rohan Gunaratna states that the Tamil diaspora has supported all the atrocities committed by the LTTE in Sri Lanka, including the killing of civilians, during the last three decades. However, with the defeat of the LTTE, Tamil diaspora organizations have since emerged as champions of human rights. The former LTTE militant Nediyan, who succeeded Prabhakaran, is organizing these groups.¹⁶¹ The

¹⁶⁰ Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam, "'Trees for Justice' Campaign."

¹⁶¹ Gunaratna, "LTTE Affiliates up to Same Old Tricks."

Tamil diaspora uses allegations of human rights violations as a strategy to demand a Tamil homeland in North and East Sri Lanka—a trump card being exploited by the diaspora.

The Sri Lankan government has failed to counter these allegations. President Mahinda Rajapaksha's previous government has faced overwhelming international pressure stemming from these allegations. According to Gunaratna, Sri Lankan diplomats were not adequately educated to counter and uphold Sri Lanka's successes in the reconciliation process.¹⁶² However, by rejecting the investigation proposed by the UNHCR, President Rajapaksha's government created an unpleasant situation in the international arena. Moreover, the current administration has not forwarded a clear strategy to directly address alleged human rights violations, other than allowing what the UNHCR has recommended. Even the present government is reluctant to take remedial actions on human rights allegations due to tension and confusion within the Sinhalese community, which strongly supports the suppression of the LTTE as a terrorist organization. However, allegations of human rights violations are another matter, which could lead to further division between Sinhala and Tamil communities.

c. The Re-emergence of the LTTE in Sri Lanka

LTTE supporters abroad are still trying to promote the LTTE's separatist ideology in Sri Lanka. Re-emergence attempts made by radical Tamil diaspora groups, as shown in Chapter II, corroborate this. Also, Gunaratna has stated that in the southern region of India, a few hundred remaining LTTE militants, sympathizers, and recently formed Eelam organizations created in May 1985 have recently emerged. They are involved in politicizing, radicalizing, and mobilizing the Tamil communities in India and Malaysia.¹⁶³ Although Sri Lanka today is a stable country, national security is still a serious concern due to pro-LTTE radical groups. It is vital that the present peace not be taken for granted. Sri Lanka still has challenges to its vital national interests that have the potential for disharmony and conflict.

¹⁶² Gunaratna, "LTTE Affiliates up to Same Old Tricks."

¹⁶³ Ibid.

Presently, the Tamil community remains exhausted by having witnessed and experienced the total failure of the LTTE's armed struggle. Therefore, the possibility of the LTTE or another militant group in the North and East reemerging at the same level would be dire; this chance is very remote, however. The racism of the Tamil people against the Sri Lankan majority that remains is due to the prevailing political, economic, security, social, and educational atmosphere in the country. However, incidents taking place in isolation involving ex-militants and rival factions, as well as those involving personal clashes, cannot be viewed as a struggle with strategic objectives in mind for creating a separate state.

d. The Removal of Military Bases in the North and East

Tamil diaspora organizations demand the withdrawal of Sri Lankan troops from North and East Sri Lanka. The TGTE also demands the removal of military bases to achieve the "freedom of the Tamil people on the basis of their fundamental political principles of nationhood, homeland, and right of self-determination."¹⁶⁴ The Tamil diaspora's main concern was calling for a mechanism to fight for the land issue¹⁶⁵ and removal of military bases from the North and East.¹⁶⁶ However, on February 9, 2015, Sri Lankan Cabinet Minister and former LTTE militant Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan (alias Karuna Amman) addressed the Sri Lankan parliament and countered this military withdrawal from the North. The government was reluctant to withdraw military bases from the North because the Tamil youth had been provoked into radical activities by the TNA, and the Sri Lankan Navy was needed to guard against sea encroachment by South Indian fishermen who threatened Tamil fishermen. Muralitharan went on to say that the military's presence was also required to conduct disaster relief operations for tsunamis and other natural disasters. He also blamed the TNA for standing with the Tamil diaspora

¹⁶⁴ "Mission Statement," Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam-USA, accessed January 10, 2016, <http://www.tgte-us.org/mission.html>.

¹⁶⁵ "Opening Day of International Land Grabs Conference Draws to a Successful Close," January 31, 2014, <http://tamilsforum.co.uk/2014/01/opening-day-of-international-land-grabs-conference-draws-to-a-close/>.

¹⁶⁶ "Removal of Army Camps from Sri Lanka's North Will Not Be a Reality, President Says," Colombo Page, October 29, 2013, http://www.colombopage.com/archive_13B/Oct29_1383067520CH.php.

without cooperating with the legitimate government.¹⁶⁷ The security forces are responsible for the national security of the entire country. Therefore, the government cannot accede to the Tamil diaspora's demand for withdrawing from military bases.

e. The Tamil Diaspora's Influence on the Political Stability of the Country

The Tamil diaspora seems to be utilizing all the political authority available at hand to influence host countries aligning with its ideology. It has been creative enough to attract and profess its ideology among local and international politicians, diplomats, policy makers, and non-state actors who have the capacity to influence Sri Lanka.¹⁶⁸ The present political, diplomatic, and security environment seems to reflect the Tamil diaspora's chosen path of approach, which is non-violent yet supports the same LTTE ideology—a separate state. Doing so, the diaspora believes that a greater devolution of power could be materialized in north and East Sri Lanka, which would also facilitate establishing a state of Eelam through a referendum.

The Tamil diaspora utilizes the media and the TNA to weaken the political stability in Sri Lanka. The Tamil diaspora along with its media network plays a critical role in educating and professing its ideology throughout the world, using even cyberspace to discredit the government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) through accusations of genocide and war crimes, and messages to the international community.¹⁶⁹ The Tamil diaspora also goes to the extent of manipulating the TNA in many ways to achieve its own internal and external interests. The representation of the TNA in mainstream Sri Lankan politics has proven very positive in consolidating and justifying the Tamil diaspora message to the

¹⁶⁷ “Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan aka Karuna Amman’s Speech at Parliament in Sri Lanka,” YouTube video, 9:52, posted by “Kandy TV,” February 9, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=odHSunSt5hM>.

¹⁶⁸ Gunaratna, “LTTE Affiliates up to Same Old Tricks.”

¹⁶⁹ Camelia Nathaniel, “The Nediawan’s Faction,” Tamil Elam People’s Alliance (TEPA), April 27, 2104, <https://terroristfronts.wordpress.com/2014/04/27/the-nediavans-faction-tamil-eelam-peoples-alliance-tepa/>.

entire world.¹⁷⁰ The diaspora allegedly professes the Tamil aspirations to indulge in what is termed a genuine Tamil political claim to the Sri Lankan government.

B. INTERESTS OF TAMIL NATIONAL ALLIANCE AND SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT

1. Complementary Interests

a. Developing Infrastructure in North and East Sri Lanka

Although the government and the TNA have the same interest in developing infrastructure in Sri Lanka, they did not cooperate directly with each other. After defeating the LTTE terrorist group in 2009, the Sri Lankan government made immediate infrastructure development a priority through the projects, *Uthuru Wasanthaya*¹⁷¹ and *Nagenahira Udanaya*.¹⁷² The former government had held the view that appointing Major General G. A. Chandrasiri, a senior ex-military officer, as the governor immediately after the war would facilitate the smooth functioning of all activities while having extensive military support for the infrastructure development. However, the TNA undermined the government effort taken for development, claiming that the government seemed to propose military control over the North and East.¹⁷³ Therefore, this situation disturbed the coexistence between the general public and the military, creating unwanted ethnic division. The TNA also criticized the government for secretly utilizing the funds required for the infrastructure development under its control.

Though the government was focused on infrastructure development following the war, it did not take effective measures to eradicate the poverty among those who were most affected. The Tamils in the north and east do not have many opportunities to generate income other than through agriculture, fishing, and small businesses. To

¹⁷⁰ “A Dawn in Darker Times,” accessed March 15, 2016, <http://www.globaltamilnews.net/AboutUs/tabid/66/language/en-U.S./Default.aspx>.

¹⁷¹ “Sri Lanka to Spend 253 Billion Rupees,” Colombo Page.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ “Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Military,” International Crisis Group, March 16, 2012, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/220-sri-lankas-north-ii-rebuilding-under-the-military.aspx>.

overcome the adverse situation arising from the effects of the war, the TNA also failed to use the opportunity to convince and motivate the diaspora to utilize its funds to eradicate poverty. Due to the tug-of-war between the government and the TNA, neither addressed the problem of the common and poor Tamil people who were less interested in the concept of a separate state and self-determination.

2. Conflicting Interests

a. Demanding Devolution of Power

The TNA continuously emphasized the devolution of power in Sri Lanka. According to the manifesto released by the TNA, “Devolution of power on the basis of shared sovereignty shall necessarily be over land, law and order, socio-economic development including health and education, resources and fiscal powers.”¹⁷⁴ However, the elaboration of the facts thus outlined regarding housing, livelihood, education, employment does not seem to cover the entire Tamil population’s genuine requirements envisioned by the Tamil population in the North and East. The TNA is not going to serve and govern the northern peninsula in collaboration with the mainstream political parties of the country. The TNA today manifests somewhat closer ideologies to the LTTE and its diaspora.¹⁷⁵

Devolution of powers is a political concept; decentralization of political powers is the ultimate focus of this concept. This concept is not a new thing to Sri Lanka, as the demand for political power surfaced following independence from British rule in 1948.¹⁷⁶ It is unclear whether this was in fact a demand of the majority of Tamils or a manipulation of certain Tamil political leaders who had been subverted by politics in Tamil Nadu using the concept of a Tamil homeland.

¹⁷⁴Tamil Net, “TNA Releases Election Manifesto,” *Tamil Net website*, accessed January 5, 2016. http://tnapolitics.org/?page_id=33.

¹⁷⁵ “Our Stand on the Political Solution.”

¹⁷⁶ A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, *Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Vancouver, British Columbia: UBC Press, 2000), 82.

Devolution of powers is another political trap similar to the presidential and provincial council systems. Once introduced and implemented in the north and east, the system will have to be kept for some years to see progress. The possibility of reverting the new system to the previous status would not be possible once it is introduced. A new political system would add further complexity to the already complex political landscape of Sri Lanka. Today, a majority of Sri Lankans do not accept either executive presidential¹⁷⁷ or provincial council¹⁷⁸ systems. They have found that both systems are “white elephants.” However, once political reforms have been introduced and implemented into the political system of Sri Lanka’s government, it may not be possible to abolish, review, revert from, or remove them.

b. External Support from Tamil Diaspora Including Tamil Nadu

The TNA’s election manifesto in the post-war period closely resembles the LTTE’s ideology in the pre-war period. The TNA manifesto is based on the Vaddukodai Resolution and aligns with the TGTE’s and GTF’s Tamil ideology. The Tamil diaspora depends totally on the TNA to profess its ideology, yet the TNA has no bearing whatsoever on the actual grievances of Tamils in Sri Lanka.¹⁷⁹ For this reason, the TGTE and the GTF refer to the TNA as the sole representative of the Tamils in Sri Lanka. Conversely, the TNA depends completely on the diaspora to fund its political campaign. Hence, the Tamil diaspora presses its iron fist over the TNA, and the TNA in turn would do anything to satisfy the Tamil diaspora.

The TNA alignment with the Tamil diaspora and Tamil Nadu with regard to the internal political problems creates further distrust within the government and the Sinhala community. The possibility of expatriates who have already migrated to foreign countries

¹⁷⁷ Pramod De Silva, “A New Sri Lankan Journey,” *Daily News*, February 3, 2016, <http://www.dailynews.lk/?q=2016/02/03/features/new-sri-lankan-journey>.

¹⁷⁸ “Provincial Council System Fails to Address the Problems of Sri Lanka’s North and East - JHU,” Colombo Page, May 27, 2013, http://www.colombopage.com/archive_13A/May27_1369663842JR.php.

¹⁷⁹ Lasanda Kurukulasuriya, “Tamil National Alliance Election Manifesto Aimed at Tamil Diaspora and not Meant for Tamil Voters of North,” accessed March 21, 2016, <http://dbsjeyaraj.com/dbsj/archives/25463>.

returning to Sri Lanka to settle down for good is very remote. Also, these situations cannot be compared to the situation in Sri Lanka since there is a vast difference between the cultural and political systems in India and Tamil Nadu. Therefore, the TNA has to work in close collaboration with the existing government of Sri Lanka. There are enough examples in the outside world wherein external involvement in the internal problems of a country go unsolved and further complicate problems. During the past three decades, the Tamil diaspora and India have both supported the LTTE to fight a prolonged war. In the end, however, no substantial gain.

c. Removing Security Forces from the North and East

As with the Tamil diaspora, the TNA is also trying to remove security forces from the North and East. Therefore, the same analysis is relevant to the TNA. The author does not analyze the same under the TNA's conflicting interest.

C. INTERESTS OF GOVERNMENT

1. Complementary Interests

a. Securing a Political Settlement of the Ethnic Conflict

For the first time in the history of Sri Lankan politics, the United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), formerly staunch rivals, have united to form a consensus government under the leadership of the President Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil Wickramasignhe.¹⁸⁰ This main amalgamation of the two political parties will also help the government arrive at a political settlement on the prevailing ethnic issue. Mangala Samaraweera in his inaugural speech at the Human Rights Council emphasized the need for confidence building as the most crucial and important potential for the people of the nation affected by the conflict. By winning the last general election, the United National Front created a favorable environment for accelerating its political agenda. This collaboration seems to be a new culture of Sri Lankan politics. That the new government defeated the extremists on both sides who were separated can be thought of as a reward for the moderates in parliament.

¹⁸⁰ "Statement by Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera," Embassy of Sri Lanka.

The ethnic issue is a politically created one because of bad or weak governance. Apart from the ethnic issue, another two insurgencies came into being in 1971 and during 1987–89 along with a separatist conflict due to bad governance in the country.¹⁸¹ Since 1948, three complex political systems have existed that have not taken responsibility and accountability for the situations.¹⁸² All three political systems worked in isolation. Hence, the pattern of thinking among individual groups has been in disarray. Since independence, Sri Lanka has not shown any progressive signs in human development. The vast volume of migration at different waves in the history is but one example.

The military defeat of the LTTE was not the end of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. Those who exploited the situation have demonstrated to the world that this is an ethnic crisis that must ultimately be solved by political means. Both Sinhala and Tamil political parties seem to take undue advantage of the political situation and agitate people of both communities based on separatism. The Sinhala parties who need power through a political majority say that any devolution of power would lead to separatism. Conversely, the Tamil parties who anticipate a majority say that power-sharing with a Sinhalese majority government would deprive them of their right to exist.

Also, due to the complexity of governance, people have become more racially and religiously oriented. The devolution of powers would not only create further disharmony but also lead to fresh bloodshed in different forms as shown in Sri Lanka's history; the possibility of future civil or ethnic clashes certainly exists. Agitated Sinhala extremists would try to chase the Tamil communities from areas where the majority of Sinhalese live. These clashes may even extend to Muslim-populated areas in the North as well if any homeland concept is felt.

It is necessary to grant equal rights and a feasible livelihood to the people of the north and east. It does not mean that the Sri Lankan government should simply introduce

¹⁸¹ Owen Bennett, "The Patriotic Struggle of Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna: A Reappraisal," (bachelor's thesis, RMIT University, October 2013), http://jvpthesis.weebly.com/uploads/2/6/9/5/26951649/jvp_thesis_final_1.pdf.

¹⁸² Ashwini Vasanthakumar, "Three Key Constitutional Reforms for Sri Lanka," accessed March 17, 2016. <http://www.icconnectblog.com/2015/02/three-key-constitutional-reforms-for-sri-lanka/>.

a devolution of power similar to that which has been practiced by other countries like India due to outside interference. Also, Tamil politicians and self-serving people have tried to manipulate the majority of poor Tamils, exploiting their fear that the government is not interested in alleviating their poverty but rather in controlling their behavior. There is the possibility of granting judicial, land, and police powers to the province, which the central government has the capacity to overrule at any time. Since independence, all successive governments have been reluctant to dilute authority due to the mistrust that has existed for so many decades. The government suspects that the devolution of such powers will lead to the establishment of a separate state as envisioned by the Tamil diaspora.

b. A Continuation of Recommendations Made by the LLRC

President Sirisena in his manifesto pointed out that he will use the South African model as an example of reconciliation and peace building. Accordingly, the government has stated that it plans to set up a commission in consultation with appropriate authorities in South Africa regarding justice reconciliation and non-recurrence of issues. However, the South African High Commissioner in Sri Lanka Geoff Doidge states that “Sri Lanka should adopt a home-grown solution to the ethnic issue as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of South Africa cannot be replicated anywhere else in the world.”¹⁸³ The crisis in Sri Lanka is far too complex and rooted in the history than the South African situation. Also, other outside agencies do not have the ability to understand the internal affairs and problems existing in Sri Lanka. Therefore, Sri Lankan authorities must arrive at a solution rather than try to seek outside interference and mediation.

D. EXISTING STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES, AND THREATS FOR THE SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT

The following analysis explores the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) for the Sri Lankan government as it works to obtain lasting peace.

¹⁸³Sulochana Ramiah Mohan, “TRC Cannot Be Replicated – SA Envoy,” *Ceylon Today*, accessed February 15, 2015, <http://ceylontoday.lk/51-84892-news-detail-trc-cannot-be-replicated-sa-envoy.html>.

1. Strengths

The Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the United National Party (UNP) have joined to form a single governing group in Parliament, thus creating a two-thirds majority for the governing side. This power enables the government to come to a consensus about matters of interest. Also, there is multi-party, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious representation in the Parliament, which includes Tamils. This representation allows for a good formulation of many different segments of the society. This coalition will help eradicate political extremism and rivalry between political parties.

The positive diplomatic relationships between Western and European countries and the image created by the government through successful infrastructure development in the North and East will be favorable in resolving the ethnic problem. Normalcy during the post-conflict period has added credibility to the governing authorities as an indicator of stability within the country. Furthermore, after 2015, Sri Lanka's present government has been able to build up positive and fresh relations with Western and European countries in addition to India. This relationship ensures Western support in international forums and matters arising before the UN Security Council that threaten Sri Lanka's national interests.

Devolution of power and due recognition of the Tamils will facilitate an amicable solution to overcome mistrust and discrimination. Establishment of the Northern Provincial Council completed one of the much-debated requirements of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution. This authority itself poses as a good response to allegations against the political authorities for not fully implementing the amendment. Additionally, the government has given due recognition to the Tamil National Alliance by appointing Rajavaroatham Sampanthan as the leader of the opposition in the present government. The appointment of Kanagasabapathy Sripavan as the Chief Justice of Sri Lanka is another critical decision to prove the implementation of justice.

2. Weaknesses

The requirement for a long-term and sustainable policy is necessary for finding solutions to the ethnic problem prevailing in Sri Lanka. No government in the past or

present has thought of solving this problem as a matter of priority. Frequent changes to the system and its policies have not allowed for the establishment and development of a positive relationship between ethnicities in Sri Lanka. The political authorities have not shown the ability to completely win the hearts and minds of the Tamil population in the North and East after defeating the LTTE in 2009. This inaction deprived the Tamils of their political power in the Northern Provincial Council.

President Rajapaksa's administration has not shown the ability to cultivate positive relations with Western and European countries to manage the existing issues with the Tamil diaspora diplomatically. Furthermore, the Sri Lankan government has failed to counter allegations of war crimes or coordinate with the UNHCR to investigate these allegations. The previous administration faced overwhelming international pressure stemming from these allegations. These misjudgments have compounded the allegations leveled by the Tamil diaspora. This negligence of remedial action has further increased tensions.

Political authorities have not been able to fully resettle the Sinhala and Muslim communities who fled from the North and East during the war. This seemed to deprive the ethnic Tamils who had lived in the North throughout the war an opportunity to understand the Sinhalese and Muslim communities through living with them. This situation created an unwanted division among the ethnic groups by depriving them of their opportunity to coexist as Sri Lankans. This segregation will have an adverse effect on the country's future stability and territorial integrity. Also, Sri Lanka has recently seen the emergence of political, religious, and ethnic extremist groups within the country. This has created an environment of suspicion and uneasiness among different ethnic and religious groups.

The absence of a strong diplomatic capability to voice Sri Lankan opinions internationally regarding Tamil ethnic separatism in Sri Lanka remains a failure to date. The government's counterpropaganda mechanism has not shown good results from the inception of the war until now. The Tamil diaspora has taken advantage of this failure and exploited the allegations to achieve the objective of a Tamil homeland. This

weakness has created an unfavorable situation for the government of Sri Lanka in forums in which this matter is discussed internationally.

The government has failed to amend the present constitution of the provincial council system (the 13th Amendment) that includes police and land powers. This provision has created space for any political party with separatist ideologies to influence the law and order a framework for the country if it comes into power in any provincial council. The presence of Sinhala extremist groups opposing the peace movement in the Parliament is creating an environment whereby they misinterpret all movements for a political settlement.

3. Opportunities

Establishment of the Northern Provincial Council with the TNA in power has created a positive relationship for peaceful political negotiation. Devolution of power can be used to eradicate separatist ideology to function under the constitutional framework of the country. This, in turn, provides the government with an opportunity to execute government policies through the Northern Provincial Council authorities, to act on legal grounds, and to punish any offenders for attempts at breaching the constitutional provisions.

The rise of extremist elements in the world has raised the awareness of major powers in devising ways and means to fight these elements. Sri Lanka's fight against separatism and attempts to prevent the reemergence of terrorism within the country can also be interpreted within this broad framework. As a result, there is an opportunity for the country to gain support from major powers for the Tamil diaspora's radical activities. For example, the U.S. policy on the war against terror paved the way to cut off the LTTE and diaspora relationship during the conflict.

The end of the war has created an opportunity to recruit more individuals from minority groups into the military. This recruitment creates the environment to have more diversity in the military and to be rid of the popular reference to the Sri Lankan military by some parties as a totally "Sinhalese" military. Presently, the Tamils consider military deployment in the North and East as an intruding element. The Tamils in the North do

not think of the existing threat of the Tamil Nadu as an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) to Tamil fishermen's limited opportunities.

The Tamil diaspora and the TNA are interested in developing the North and East. The government is not in a position to manage the situation in terms of their grievances. The eradication of poverty and creation of income generating systems are of paramount importance. Obtaining assistance from the Tamil diaspora for infrastructure development and rehabilitation projects for the North and East is essential. The Tamil diaspora has given financial support to the LTTE to fight against the government. Now the opportunity has come to divert those funds for the reconstruction and rehabilitation process in the North and East.

4. Threats

Although the LTTE was militarily defeated, the ideology of a Tamil homeland or separate state in Sri Lanka remains unchanged. This is a great drawback and has to be addressed through proper channels; otherwise, the threat to the government will not ease as anticipated. The diaspora radical groups have made many attempts to revive the LTTE insurgency in Sri Lanka. This would adversely affect the smooth functioning of the development and reconciliation process. Also, these attempts would create an unnecessary disturbance for the Tamils in the country who do not anticipate a re-emergence of the LTTE violence.

The Tamil diaspora accused the Sri Lankan state and military of alleged genocide against the Tamils, mainly in the latter stages of the war. These allegations could result in unfavorable conditions for the co-existence of Sinhalese and Tamils living in the country. The pro-separatist diaspora's activities and the relations it has established with the West pose the gravest political and diplomatic threat to the country at present. These relations with the West make it easy for them to discredit the Sri Lankan government and gain the sympathy of powerful countries for their cause.

The threat to the existence of military bases in the North and East would endanger national security and create an unfavorable situation to the whole country. This would also facilitate the fear of a re-emerging LTTE-type of threat and declaration of a separate

state. Conversely, the presence of a hostile provincial government in Tamil Nadu poses a threat in the post-war era. The distance from Tamil Nadu to Sri Lanka is small—54 km. Also, sympathizers in Tamil Nadu share many things with the pro-separatist Tamil ethnic elements within Sri Lanka, including language and the religion. This relationship with Tamil Nadu greatly influences the position of separatists against the Sri Lankan government.

The present socio-political system causes the public to be increasingly insensitive to threats to Sri Lankan national security and to focus primarily on routine needs for survival. This insensitivity of the public is also a threat to peace as it makes it easy for external interest parties to easily influence its thinking. Also, Western and European powers hostile to Sri Lanka have the ability to initiate action against the government in response to allegations made by pro-separatists groups while turning a blind eye to similar actions by friendly nations. Sri Lanka's status as a less wealthy developing country has little sway in the international arena; the presence of a hostile West is a threat.

E. POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE IMPACTS ON SUSTAINABLE PEACE FROM POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES OF PRO-LTTE MEMBERS OF THE TAMIL DIASPORA

1. Positive Impacts

The diaspora is incredibly wealthy and well settled in primarily rich countries all over the world. Hence, its investments and services may be of paramount importance in developing of North and East and eradicating the poverty of the rural folks inhabiting the region.

2. Negative Impacts

Finding a political settlement to the problem that would be acceptable to both the Tamil minority and Sinhalese majority in Sri Lanka is of paramount importance. However, the interference of the Tamil diaspora with the same ideology as the LTTE, a Tamil homeland or a Separate State in Sri Lanka creates an unfavorable situation for finding a lasting solution to the ethnic problem.

The willful negative interference of the diaspora in the domestic affairs of the country causes an interruption for the present conditions of peaceful co-existence of the citizens of Sri Lanka.

The pro-separatist Tamil diaspora and its positive relationship with the West and Europe pose the gravest political and diplomatic threat to Sri Lanka at present and discredit to the government in the international arena.

The TNA, although a part of the governing process in the Sri Lankan administration, controls and directs its activities according to the Tamil diaspora's agenda. Therefore, this interference creates an unhealthy relationship with the other political parties.

F. CONCLUSION

Since the military's defeat of the LTTE in 2009, the Tamil diaspora has remained and is still active as well as highly influential. The Tamil diaspora groups have enhanced their attempts through the organizations (the TGTE, TEPA/TNC, the GTF, the BTF, and the ex-combatant/intelligence group) of the LTTE to achieve similar goals to the LTTE's. The Sri Lankan government faces more conflicting than complementary sentiments from the Tamil diaspora organizations concerning national security, sovereignty, and integrity. First, the diaspora organizations are still influencing the international community to pressure Sri Lanka in many ways with a view of having a separate homeland within Sri Lanka. Second, the radical groups—TEPA and the ex-combatant/intelligence group of the LTTE—are interested in the reviving their separatist ideology in Sri Lanka. Third, they influenced the UNHCR to adopt a resolution calling for an international examination into purported war crimes in Sri Lanka and thereby discrediting the Sri Lankan government and the military. Also, the TNA, being the main Tamil political representative in the Sri Lankan government, is working on the same agenda as that of the Tamil diaspora. However, the previous and present governments have failed to establish a credible link with the Tamil diaspora and to effectively address the Tamil community's grievances in Sri Lanka. Therefore, considering the positive and negative

impacts of the Tamil diaspora's political and social activities, I provide recommendations in Chapter IV to achieve a lasting solution to the Sri Lankan conflict.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

A. CONCLUSION

The military's defeat of the LTTE in 2009 does not seem to be the end of the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka. A political solution is still necessary to address the core issues of this problem in the country. The government needs to look at this issue humanely to arrive at a reasonable solution. However, the government's biggest challenge is to ensure the mutual coexistence of different ethnic groups in Sri Lanka. A psychological change within the affected people has become the main issue for the behavior of the Sri Lankan population. It is a continuous process and will be different from a solution that is used to settle everyday problems. However, there can be no real final, lasting solution, since lasting solutions can often create other problems. The current situation following the defeat of the LTTE must be taken into consideration. Sri Lanka defeated the LTTE to find a solution to the ethnic problem.

The Tamil diaspora's social and political activities have a direct impact on the search for a solution to the ethnic problem. Continued attempts of the Tamil diaspora to resurrect a Tamil insurgency strongly indicate that Tamil separatist ideology still exists. The idea of a mono-ethnic Tamil homeland is much stronger among wealthy and educated global Tamils than among those living in Sri Lanka. Ironically, it is the global Tamils who seek to establish a mono-ethnic homeland in Sri Lanka, using local Tamil politics as an instrument. The TGTE, the GTF, and the BTF's actions are used as indirect political approaches to achieve their primary goal of a Tamil homeland. Their ideology calls for a distinctive approach to understand the problem.

TEPA and the ex-combatant/intelligence groups are seen adhering to radical ideas of a reemerging LTTE insurgency. They resort to acts of violence as a solution to the ethnic problem. These Tamil diaspora groups access the local Tamil population, especially ex-combatants, with the motive of a common Tamil homeland. The government must handle these situations carefully to avoid the blunders made in 1983. The government should take action to make the majority Sinhalese understand that this

method of violence is not the perception of all Tamils in Sri Lanka. There is a need to identify the radical groups' efforts and instead of using coercive force. The government needs to adopt peaceful methods to avoid any recurrence of spiraling violence. A wide-ranging contact with the leaders of the minorities must be undertaken by the government to alleviate any fears of threats.

Presently, the UNHCR resolution on alleged war crimes by the Sri Lankan military is a major issue among the diaspora. The Tamil diaspora is capitalizing on this issue, especially in the United States, Canada, and the UK to discredit the Sri Lankan government and military. Former President Rajapaksa's administration failed to effectively handle the problem from its inception. The Tamil diaspora gained an advantage over these alleged war crimes to market its "referendum" for a separate state ideology to the world. The present government has done little to address the issue in the countries where the Tamil diaspora plays a prominent role. The government should positively face the allegations rather than avoiding them.

Internally, another major challenge for the government has been to deal with the TNA to find a solution for the Tamil issue without further disturbing the coexistence between the Sinhalese and Tamil communities. The Tamil diaspora is manipulating the TNA for its own interest to achieve its internal and external goals. The representation of the TNA in the mainstream politics of Sri Lanka has become a blessing in disguise for the diaspora to speak to the world about the alleged malpractices caused by the government. The Tamil diaspora is disingenuous in professing its ideology as the Tamil people's aspiration. Conversely, the Tamil diaspora and the TNA have not given priority to addressing the immediate requirements of the Tamil people in the North and East.

Since independence in 1948, all successive governments have failed to find a genuine solution to the demands of the Tamil community. Devolution of power for balanced economic growth in the North and South is very critical. Reducing the military presence vis-à-vis security issues in the South and the East needs a careful approach. As such, the government needs to formulate a comprehensive national security strategy that encompasses economic affairs, external affairs, security, and internal law and order. Furthermore, the government needs to prioritize establishment of an independent

commission and devolution of power. The ethnic problem must be identified as a priority to maintain peace and harmony in Sri Lanka.

The aforementioned concerns related to Sri Lankan national security encompass a number of challenges the state needs to address, especially in the post-conflict scenario to ensure sustainable peace. The government should understand that side-lining the diaspora will not help the country solve the internal problem. Furthermore, the government's grand strategy in the post-conflict scenario is also based on the security strategy. The government should encourage all ethnic groups to think as one Sri Lankan nation, deviating from party politics to function in a healthy and smooth atmosphere for uplifting coexistence. In order to achieve a more permanent peace, the idea of a Sri Lankan national identity must be inculcated into the hearts and minds of children in all communities within the country.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Political and Diplomatic

First and foremost, Sri Lanka has to ensure the co-existence of Sinhala, Tamil, and Muslim communities in the country. The eradication of mistrust prior to finding a political solution is a must. Under Sri Lanka's current circumstances, political leaders should take necessary action to genuinely address the Tamil community's grievances. The TNA should cooperate with the government to ensure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka without developing further mistrust. The government, in turn, must ensure the rule of law and good governance through transparency, equal sharing of power and zero tolerance toward ethnic discrimination at government or non-government levels. Democracy must be practiced at every level with the strict implementation of law. The government must also consider enacting strong laws against ethnic violence and ensure smooth information flow from the government to the public to prevent adverse propaganda that could disrupt communal harmony.

The Sri Lankan government needs to establish a special task force to negotiate with the diaspora. The task force should cooperate with diplomatic missions to create a dialogue with both Tamil diasporic elements and Western policy makers. To achieve this

strategy, the task force together with the Sri Lankan foreign missions is necessary to carry out continuous public diplomacy campaigns to discredit Tamil diaspora's negative propaganda operations and disturb its separatist agenda. By highlighting the living standard of poor Tamils, the Tamil diaspora can contribute to rehabilitation processes in North and East Sri Lanka. The ethnic issue in Sri Lanka is a historical one, and the Sri Lankan Tamil issue has its own characteristics that are not to be found in any other part of the world. If the Tamil in Sri Lanka were granted a separatist state, the decision would worsen the situation, with more bloodshed than the three-decade conflict. Therefore, the Sri Lankan government should find suitable ways and means to evolve a viable strategy to address the homeland concept while dealing with the diaspora. First, it must dissuade the diaspora from the concept of separate homeland, and second, it must persuade an alternative concept whereby the Tamils would politically, economically, socially, and educationally enjoy the same rights and benefits as the other citizens.

The Sri Lankan government must ensure communal harmony through an accepted level of power devolution and through close ties with both the TNA and the Muslim Congress. This study recommends that implementing the existing provincial council system is in accordance with the 13th amendment which should be employed rather than introducing a new federal system. As explained in Chapter III, introducing a new system would further complicate the situation. It is unclear as to whether the devolution of power should be considered a solution for the North and East; an investigation of this option is in order. However, if the Sri Lankan government proposed a political solution that would meet the Tamils' homeland aspirations, the Tamil diaspora might be able to change its present stance. Also, a new multi-level (political, economic, educational, social, and psychological) strategy is vital to addressing the root causes that led to an ethnic problem that had a separatist concept as a solution.

To facilitate this strategy, the government needs to coordinate with Western and European countries to receive assistance in stopping Tamil diaspora activities that have negative impacts on achieving sustainable peace. Maintaining healthy and cordial relationships both in economics and political terms with the West and Europe plays a critical role in the international relations of Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka's relationship with the

West and European countries needs to be improved by productive diplomatic dialogues that are not disrupted by the Tamil diaspora's allegations.

The government should preserve the freedom of assembly for Tamils to demonstrate their grievances. Implementation of this freedom would involve ensuring that legal gatherings, demonstrations, and processions take place peacefully. The Sri Lankan authorities have not been very concerned in this regard, neither militarily nor diplomatically. They have, therefore, paid the price for overreactions that in most cases could have been very minor incidents. Deficiency in this aspect has led to the failure of the government and security forces to win the hearts and minds of the Tamil population at large.

2. Information and Technology

The government has to be aware of constantly changing situations and, when necessary, respond appropriately to new developments. To obtain public support for a political strategy, the government must convince the people that their aspirations will be totally addressed. To establish security and to achieve a national consensus, some of the criteria include: creating political and economic stability, countering extremism, and meeting external challenges. However, the government should not sideline the national vision of achieving the twin objective of sustaining development and reconciliation.

Because Sri Lanka is divided politically by ethnicity, the government needs to conduct a campaign to win the hearts and minds of the Tamils. Even though most citizens understand that racism as well as ethnic and religious division should be eradicated, the government still needs to work with extremist groups among all ethnicities to prevent conflict and bring peace to the country.

The government needs to counter the Tamil diaspora's cyber and propaganda campaigns. Information and cyber-security in a modern networking environment is an essential requirement for all countries. This situation is increasingly complex due to new security threats from social media sites. Establishing a new cyber security policy and enforcing organization are crucial requirements to secure and effectively utilize information technology in Sri Lanka.

3. Military

The government should cut off existing threats from Tamil Nadu, especially the radical groups who have made attempts to re-start the LTTE in Sri Lanka (three prominent incidents have been detailed in Chapter III). The Tamil-populated Indian province of Tamil Nadu is likely to remain a source of concern for a renewed separatist movement. The government needs to increase the utilization of the Navy and Coast Guard in a border-protection role to the Sri Lankan EEZ, especially in the North and East, which should help mitigate the threat of pro-LTTE elements infiltrating from waters off Tamil Nadu. The Army must also be deployed to cover coastal areas that are not covered by naval elements to resist illegal access via sea, and the Air Force has to develop its capabilities in surveillance.

The government must develop a civil–military secret service type organization to gather, process, analyze information both locally and overseas, and feed this analysis to the state leadership for necessary action. The secret service also needs to develop and integrate a national-level intelligence policy with foreign agencies. The Sri Lankan government has the option to double its intelligence strength, especially in the conflict zones of the past. Had it done so previously, the military would have defeated the LTTE movement at its early stages, before it could grow to such dangerous levels. Future threats of insurgency can likely be defeated. In a previous work, this author argues that it is vital to “build a common intelligence database, conduct joint training,”¹⁸⁴ and share technology, expertise, and experience. Extensive training and awareness programs should be carried out to counter the separatist ideology. Identification of resistance networks is another important factor in this regard. All training should be diverted to effectively harnessing the skills of individuals to face strategic situations at any level and at any moment in the future. The coordination of friendly foreign nations would be helpful in building intelligence networks in their design and research.

The government must recruit Tamils into the military and, particularly, into the police department to give them due recognition as part of the security system of the state.

¹⁸⁴ Perera, “The Sri Lankan Civil War.”

This integration will also help in the reconciliation program. All efforts must be made to reintegrate the Tamil ethnic minority back into the national fold. This will help the government eliminate the Tamils' mistrust and negative impression toward the security forces. Since the Tamil minority is part and parcel of the nation as a whole, this ethnic group should not be treated as outsiders but should be given responsibility for the nation's safety. As responsible citizens of the country, they should be called upon to hold the responsibility of nation-building, along with the rest of the other ethnic groups including the majority Sinhalese. This action is a feasible solution for creating a positive impression of the Sri Lankan military. This remedy for social integration would also be recognized internationally as components essential for a successful and a well-reformed nation.

Since there is no longer imminent threat from LTTE, the government should take appropriate action to release private land to the original owners. The government should redeploy forces island-wide based on a strategic appreciation of the present threat. The security forces should hold strategically important places only. Otherwise, the pre-positioning of the military in large strengths in the North and East would lead to acquiring the lands of civil personnel and properties under military control. It also would disturb the freedom of the communities in the area. Furthermore, the TNA and other pro-LTTE sympathizers, both local and foreign, would likely exploit this situation for social and ethnic propaganda. To address this, the military forces should be re-positioned in the cantonments without completely de-militarizing the area.

4. Economy

The Sri Lankan government should improve economic conditions and job opportunities in the Tamil areas. It is highly necessary to maintain internal peace and stability through economic development of the country by ensuring social security. The government has to initiate a plan to uplift the living standard of the poor Tamil people to at least a lower middle-class level. Thus, recommended education and training areas are of paramount importance to reach such a social level. Simultaneously, the government

should take appropriate actions to reopen factories and other industries closed due to the conflict.

The government should encourage wealthy members of the Tamil diaspora to invest in major projects in the North and East of the country. The government should give priority and high preference to Tamil investors. This effort should be strengthened by the use of skillful diplomacy. In this context, the Sri Lankan diplomatic mission abroad pursues realistic and effective diplomatic goals to enhance relationships between both host countries and the Tamil diaspora.

C. RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

It is necessary to identify the different groups of the Tamil diaspora based on their ideas of the ethnic problem and its solution. There are about 1,506,000 Sri Lankan Tamils spread across the world; nearly half of them reside in the United States, Canada, and the UK.¹⁸⁵ However, not all the Sri Lankan Tamils can be categorized as pro-LTTE Tamil diaspora, supporting the idea of a separate state in Sri Lanka. In the 2010 elections, only 65,000 out of 300,000 people voted during the poll organized by the Tamil National Council in the UK. According to the Tamil National Council, only 185 (0.29 percent) opposed creating a separate state in Sri Lanka.¹⁸⁶ Future research should focus on identifying the opinions of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora residing all over the world, particularly in Canada, the UK, and the United States, regarding its views concerning Tamil statehood (mainly a pro-LTTE concern).

There is an avenue to study aspects of the Tamil diaspora network. Any attempt to counter the Tamil diaspora organizations' threat to Sri Lankan stability in the present day context requires a systematic approach for understanding their interconnectedness. Also, the identification of Tamil diaspora organizations' links across people and institutions on a global level is of paramount importance to identify and counter the different threats to

¹⁸⁵ "Evolution of Liberation Tigers," Ministry of Defense.

¹⁸⁶ Jones, "British-based Tamils Vote for Independent State." The voters were given a question, referencing the 1976 resolution that had proclaimed in Vaddukoddai, Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka. A broader understanding of the Tamil diaspora's involvement will impart a deeper insight into its *modus operandi* and, therefore, uncover ways of effectively preempting and disabling such networks.

There is a potential threat to Sri Lankan and Canadian political stability from radical Tamil parliamentarians in Canada. There are approximately 300,000 Sri Lankan Tamils living in Toronto and its suburbs.¹⁸⁷ Based on Sri Lanka's past, the situation in Toronto may be of concern. With the growth of the Tamil diaspora in Canada, the political situation between the diaspora and Sri Lanka becomes complicated due to its transnational character.¹⁸⁸ Radical Tamil parliamentarians were responsible for opening the doors of parliament to key leaders of terrorist fronts and allowing them to lobby political parties and politicians.¹⁸⁹ Therefore, a study is needed to analyze the Tamil diaspora's behavior in Canada and its capability to enter office in Canada's parliament to promote extremism that could create an unstable situation in Sri Lanka and Canada.

¹⁸⁷ Nathaniel, "Canada's Emerging Politics of Terror."

¹⁸⁸ Amarnath Amarasingam, "The Tamil Community in Canada: A Brief Overview," Tamil Culture, January 2, 2014, <http://tamilculture.com/the-tamil-community-in-canada-a-brief-overview/>.

¹⁸⁹ Nathaniel, "Canada's Emerging Politics of Terror."

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF REFERENCES

- Anthony, Maya. "The LTTE Nediyanwan Faction to Continue the Fight: Launches a New Tamil TV Channel 'Deepam.'" Tamil Elam People's Alliance (TEPA). December 27, 2015. <https://terroristfronts.wordpress.com/2015/12/27/the-ltte-nediyanwan-faction-to-continue-the-fight-launches-a-new-tamil-tv-channel-deepam-2/>.
- Amarasinghe, Udeshi. "Modus Operandi: Tamil Diaspora and LTTE Organizations." Official Government News Portal of Sri Lanka. Accessed August 11, 2015. <http://www.news.lk/features/item/1084-modus-operandi-tamil-diaspora-and-ltte-organisations>.
- Amarasingam, Amarnath. "The Tamil Community in Canada: A Brief Overview." Tamil Culture. January 2, 2014. <http://tamilculture.com/the-tamil-community-in-canada-a-brief-overview/>.
- Bandarage, Chanaka. "UNHCR Sessions in Geneva in March 2014." Lankaweb. January 13, 2014. <http://www.lankaweb.com/news/items/2014/01/13/unhcr-sessions-in-geneva-in-march-2014/>.
- Battle, Stephen L. "Lessons in Legitimacy: The LTTE End-game of 2007–2009." Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010.
- BBC, "Rudrakumaran 'PM of Tamil Government,'" October 3, 2010, http://www.bbc.com/sinhala/news/story/2010/10/101003_tgte_government.shtml.
- Bennett, Owen. "The Patriotic Struggle of Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna: A Reappraisal." Bachelor's thesis, RMIT University, October 2013. http://jvpthesis.weebly.com/uploads/2/6/9/5/26951649/jvp_thisis_final_1.pdf.
- Blog of the International Journal of Constitutional Law and ConstitutionMaking.org.* <http://www.icconnectblog.com/>.
- British Tamils Forum. "About." Accessed January 11, 2016. <http://tamilsforum.co.uk/about/>.
- . "Opening Day of International Land Grabs Conference Draws to a Successful Close," January 31, 2014, <http://tamilsforum.co.uk/2014/01/opening-day-of-international-land-grabs-conference-draws-to-a-close/>.
- Brutt-Griffler, Janina. "Class, Ethnicity, and Language Rights: An Analysis of British Colonial Policy in Lesotho and Sri Lanka and Some Implications for Language Policy." *Journal of Language, Identity, and Education* 1, no. 3 (2002): 207–234. doi: 10.1207/S15327701JLIE0103_3.

- Canadian Press, "Harper Plans to Boycott Commonwealth Summit in Sri Lanka," October 7, 2013, <http://o.canada.com/news/harper-plans-to-boycott-commonwealth-summit-in-sri-lanka>.
- CBC News, "Canada's First Tamil MP Looks Forward to Challenge," May 3, 2011, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/canada-s-first-tamil-mp-looks-forward-to-challenge-1.1061403>.
- Colombo Page, "Sri Lanka to Spend 253 Billion Rupees for Development of Northern Province," May 20, 2011, http://www.colombopage.com/archive_11/May20_1305914434CH.php.
- . "Removal of Army Camps from Sri Lanka's North Will Not Be a Reality, President Says," October 29, 2013, http://www.colombopage.com/archive_13B/Oct29_1383067520CH.php.
- . "Provincial Council System Fails to Address the Problems of Sri Lanka's North and East - JHU," May 27, 2013, http://www.colombopage.com/archive_13A/May27_1369663842JR.php.
- Colombo Telegraph, "David Cameron's Decision on CHOGM Sets the Wrong Precedence – British Tamils Forum," May 8, 2013, <https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/david-camerons-decision-on-chogm-sets-the-wrong-precedence-british-tamils-forum/>.
- Department of Census Statistics in Sri Lanka. "Lanka Census of Population and Housing, 2011." Accessed April 12, 2016. <http://www.statistics.gov.lk/PopHouSat/CPH2011/index.php?fileName=pop42&g p=Activities&tpl=3>.
- De Silva, Pramod. "A New Sri Lankan Journey." *Daily News*, February 3, 2016. <http://www.dailynews.lk/?q=2016/02/03/features/new-sri-lankan-journey>.
- Embassy of Sri Lanka, "Statement by Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera at the 30th Session of the Human Rights Council in Geneva," September 16, 2015, <http://slembassyusa.org/news/statement-by-foreign-minister-mangala-samaraweera-at-the-30th-session-of-the-human-rights-council-in-geneva/>.
- English, Kathy. "The Truth about Tamil Statistics." *Toronto Star*, January 8, 2015. http://www.thestar.com/opinion/columnists/2009/04/04/the_truth_about_tamil_statistics.html.
- Eye Sri Lanka, "Conservative Party Members of Parliament Voice Support for the Tamil Community," October 2, 2014, <http://www.eyesrilanka.com/2014/10/02/conservative-party-members-of-parliament-voice-support-for-the-tamil-community/>.

- Fair, C. Christine. "The Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora: Sustaining Conflict and Pushing for Peace." In *Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers*, edited by Hazel Smith and Paul B. Stares, 172–195. New York: United Nations University Press, 2007.
- Fick, Maggie. "Over 99 Pct in Southern Sudan Vote for Secession." *USA Today*, January 30, 2011. http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/topstories/2011-01-30-2052877353_x.htm.
- Global Tamil News. "A Dawn in Darker Times." Accessed March 15, 2016. <http://www.globaltamilnews.net/AboutUs/tabid/66/language/en-US/Default.aspx>.
- Global Tamil Forum. "About Us." Accessed January 12, 2016. <http://www.globaltamilforum.org/about-us.aspx>.
- Gunaratna, Rohan. *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India's Intelligence Agencies*. Colombo, Sri Lanka: South Asian Network on Conflict Research, 1993.
- . "LTTE Affiliates up to Same Old Tricks in Geneva - Prof. Dr. Rohan Gunaratna." *Daily News*, October 20, 2015. www.dailynews.lk/?q=features/ltte-affiliates-same-old-tricks-geneva-prof-dr-rohan-gunaratna.
- . *War & Peace in Sri Lanka, with a Post-Accord Report from Jaffna*. Colombo, Sri Lanka: Institute of Fundamental Studies, 1987.
- Gunatilleke, Nadira. "LTTE Lobby Swamps Geneva." *Daily News*, February 19, 2013. <http://archives.dailynews.lk/2013/02/19/news01.asp>.
- Hashim, Ahmed. *When Counterinsurgency Wins: Sri Lanka's Defeat of the Tamil Tigers*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013.
- Human Rights Watch, "Behind the Red Line: Political Repression in Sudan," May 1996, <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1996/Sudan.htm>.
- International Crisis Group, "Sri Lanka's North II: Rebuilding under the Military," March 16, 2012, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/220-sri-lankas-north-ii-rebuilding-under-the-military.aspx>.
- Jacobsen, David, Paul Eggen, and Donald Kauchak. *Methods for Teaching: A Skills Approach*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993.
- Jeyaraj, D.B.S. "Death in the Jungle: Quixotic Saga of Theiveegan, Appan and Gobi." April 19, 2014. <https://tamiltigeractivities.wordpress.com/2014/04/19/death-in-the-jungle-quixotic-saga-of-theiveegan-appan-and-gobi/>.

- . “Third Abortive Diaspora-backed Attempt to Revive the LTTE.” *Daily Mirror*, April 26, 2014. <http://mirrorcitizen.dailymirror.lk/2014/04/26/third-abortive-diaspora-backed-attempt-to-revive-the-ltte/>.
- Jayatunge, Ruwan M. “The Black July 1983 that Created a Collective Trauma.” Lankaweb. April 27, 2010. <http://www.lankaweb.com/news/items/2010/04/27/the-black-july-1983-that-created-a-collective-trauma/>.
- Jones, Sam. “British-Based Tamils Vote for Independent State in Sri Lanka.” *The Guardian*, February 1, 2010. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/feb/01/british-tamil-state-sri-lanka>.
- Kriesberg, Louis. *Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007.
- Lutheran World Federation. “Ongoing Displacement and Conflict despite Independence.” Last modified February 5, 2015. <https://www.lutheranworld.org/content/south-sudan>.
- Ministry of Defense, Sri Lanka. “Evolution of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) International Network.” Accessed September 20, 2015. <http://www.defence.lk/news/pdf/LTTE%20International%20Network.pdf>.
- . “Defence Spokesperson Refutes Adverse Propaganda: Batticaloa Geared for Polls.” Accessed March 1, 2016. http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20080228_01.
- Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam, “Sri Lanka: Former US Attorney General Ramsey Clark to deliver Mullivaaikal Memorial Lecture in New York,” May 16, 2015, <http://www.tgte-homeland.org/sri-lanka-former-us-attorney-general-ramsey-clark-to-deliver-mullivaaikal-memorial-lecture-in-new-york-may-18-tgte/>.
- . “Sri Lanka: Release Tamil Prisoners of War – Worldwide Postcard Campaign Launched by TGTE.” *EIN News*, December 16, 2015. http://www.einnews.com/pr_news/302116263/sri-lanka-release-tamil-prisoners-of-war-worldwide-postcard-campaign-launched-by-tgte.
- Mohan, Sulochana Ramiah. “TRC Cannot Be Replicated – SA Envoy.” *Ceylon Today*, February 15, 2015. <http://ceylontoday.lk/51-84892-news-detail-trc-cannot-be-replicated-sa-envoy.html>.
- Nathaniel, Camelia. “The Nediyanwan’s Faction.” Tamil Elam People’s Alliance (TEPA). April 27, 2014. <https://terroristfronts.wordpress.com/2014/04/27/the-nediyanwan-faction-tamil-eelam-peoples-alliance-tepa/>.

- . “Canada’s Emerging Politics of Terror.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sri Lanka. June 29, 2014. <http://www.mea.gov.lk/index.php/news-from-other-media/4865-canadas-emerging-politics-of-terror>.
- News East West, “Canadian Tamil Congress Hails Harper for CHOGM 2013 Boycott, Urges Other Nations to Follow Suit,” October 7, 2013, <http://newseastwest.com/canadian-tamil-congress-hails-harper-for-chogm-boycott-urges-other-nations-to-follow-suit/>.
- Perera, Sylvester. “The Sri Lankan Civil War: A Personal Reminiscence.” *CTX Journal* 5 no.4 (November 2015). <https://globalecco.org/the-sri-lankan-civil-war-a-personal-reminiscence-col-sylvester-perera-sri-lankan-army>.
- Raj, Suthan. “Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE) Begins Its 2nd Parliamentary Term. Inaugural Session on December 6th.” *EIN News*, December 4, 2013. <http://www.einpresswire.com/article/179389897/transnational-government-of-tamil-eelam-tgte-begins-its-2nd-parliamentary-term-inaugural-session-on-december-6th>.
- Ridgwell, Henry. “Some Boycott Sri Lanka Commonwealth Meeting.” *Voice of America*, November 11, 2013. <http://www.voanews.com/content/some-boycott-sri-lanka-commonweath-meeting/1788057.html>.
- PRWeb, “‘Tamils for Obama’ Is Asking Our Fellow Americans to Support the Obama Campaign with Donations, and Offers a Way to Get the Money to the Obama Campaign,” October 20, 2008, <http://www.prweb.com/releases/2008/10/prweb1472214.htm>.
- . “Tamils to Obama: Meet with us to discuss future of Tamils in Sri Lanka,” January 30, 2013, <http://www.prweb.com/releases/2013/1/prweb10371655.htm>
- . “Tamils for Obama Asks Secretary Blake to Reject LLRC Report and Call for International Investigation of Sri Lanka’s Civil War,” January 5, 2012, <http://www.prweb.com/releases/2012/1/prweb9077032.htm>.
- . “Tamils for Obama Meets with Assistant Secretary Blake, Asks Blake, Clinton to Push Self-Government Referendum in Northeastern Sri Lanka,” March 27, 2012, <http://www.prweb.com/releases/2012/3/prweb9326814.htm>.
- Scoop World, “Tamil Eelam Freedom Charter Declared,” May 28, 2013, <http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO1305/S00671/tamil-eelam-freedom-charter-declared.htm>.
- Senadhira, Sugeeswara. “Sri Lanka and the 13th Amendment: What is ‘13 Plus’?” Institute of Peace Conflict Studies. July 11, 2013. <http://www.ipcs.org/article/south-asia/ipcs-debate-sri-lanka-and-the-13th-amendment-what-is-4034.html>.

- South African History Online. "Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)." Last modified April 15, 2016. <http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/truth-and-reconciliation-commission-trc>.
- Smith, Hazel and Paul B. Stares. *Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers?* New York: United Nations Publications, 2007.
- Sriskandarajah, Dhananjayan. "Tamil Diaspora Politics." In *Encyclopedia of Diasporas*. New York: Springer, 2005.
- Sri Lanka Guardian. "Manifesto: A Compassionate Maithri Governance, a Stable Country." Scribd. Accessed January 7, 2016. <https://www.scribd.com/doc/250537023/Maithripala-Sirisena-Election-2015-Manifesto-English>.
- "Sri Lankan High Commissioner to the UK Dr. Chris Nonis CNN Interview about Sri Lanka War Crimes." YouTube video. 7:00 From a CNN interview of Dr. Chris Nonis. Posted by "Chamara Kodithuwakku." November 16, 2013. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Iw_Ui-1QI8U.
- Sunday Observer. "TNA Manifesto Contains Prabhakaran's Policies." Accessed January 11, 2016. <http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2013/09/08/pol03.asp>.
- Swamy, M. R. Narayan. *The Tiger Vanquished: LTTE's Story*. New Delhi, India: SAGE Publications, 2010.
- Tamil Coordinating Committee United Kingdom, "Eelam Tamils Set to Protest Sirisena Visit to UK," March 8, 2015, <http://www.tccuk.org/?p=24>.
- Tamil Guardian, "Sri Lanka Hardens Stand on GSP Plus," October 29, 2008, <http://www.tamilguardian.com/article.asp?articleid=1959>.
- . "Sri Lanka's Killing Fields' Screened to Canadian MPs," accessed February 3, 2016. <http://www.tamilguardian.com/article.asp?articleid=3568>.
- . "Tamil Addresses British Labour Party Conference." September 24, 2008, <http://www.tamilguardian.com/article.asp?articleid=1933>.
- Tamil National Alliance. "Manifesto." Accessed January 5, 2016. http://tnapolitics.org/?page_id=33.
- . "Our Stand on the Political Solution." Accessed August 23, 2015. http://tnapolitics.org/?page_id=92.
- Tamil Net, "TNA Releases Election Manifesto," Tamil Net website, accessed January 5, 2016. http://tnapolitics.org/?page_id=33.

- Tamil Nation.org, "Tamil Eelam: Right to Self Determination," May 14, 1976,
<http://www.tamilnation.co/selfdetermination/tamileelam/7605vaddukodai.htm>.
- . "Thimpu Talks - July/August 1985," August 12, 1985,
<http://www.tamilnation.co/conflictresolution/tamileelam/85thimpu/thimpu12.htm>.
- Tamil Net. "People's Mandate Projected Differently by TNA MPs." Accessed January 11, 2016. <http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=79&artid=36739>Tamil Net.
"TNA Releases Election Manifesto." accessed January 5, 2016.
http://tnapolitics.org/?page_id=33.
- Tamil Net, "99.8 percent say yes to Tamil Eelam in Canada referendum," December 20, 2009, <http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=79&artid=30845>.
- . "GTF Launch Well Attended by British Politicians," February 25, 2010,
<http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=31263>.
- Tamil Nadu Liberation Front. "Tamil Nadu, Vishal Tamil Nadu, Tamil Desam or Greater Tamil Nadu." accessed August 20, 2015.
<http://truehindu.tripod.com/veerappan.htm>.
- Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam-USA. "Mission Statement." Accessed January 10, 2016. <http://www.tgte-us.org/mission.html>.
- . "Contact Us." Accessed February 5, 2016. <http://www.tgte-us.org/contact.html>.
- . "Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam Becomes Official," October 2, 2010,
http://www.tamilnet.com/img/publish/2010/10/TGTE_2nd_Sitting_press_release_02.10.2010_en.pdf.
- . "'Trees for Justice' Campaign Launched by TGTE to Demand Justice for Tamils Killed in Sri Lanka." *EIN News*, September 14, 2015.
http://world.einnews.com/pr_news/286289079/trees-for-justice-campaign-launched-by-tgte-to-demand-justice-for-tamils-killed-in-sri-lanka.
- Diaspora United States Tamils Political Action Council, "Black July in Sri Lanka- Yesterday and Today," July 30, 2014, <https://ustpac.org/black-july-in-sri-lanka-yesterday-and-today/>.
- U.S. Department of State, "Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Robert O. Blake Jr. Meeting with Tamil Diaspora," October 12, 2012,
<http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/press/2012/199062.htm>.

Waduge, Shenali D. "Sri Lankan Tamils Learn Lessons from What Happened to Sudan." Lankaweb. January 4, 2014.
<http://www.lankaweb.com/news/items/2014/01/04/sri-lankan-tamils-learn-lessons-from-what-happened-to-sudan/>.

Wilson, A. Jeyaratnam. *Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries*. Vancouver, British Columbia: UBC Press, 2000.

"Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan aka Karuna Amman's Speech at Parliament in Sri Lanka." YouTube video. 9:52. Posted by "Kandy TV." February 9, 2015.
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=odHSunSt5hM>.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California